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ARTICLES 
A RIGHT NOT TO MARRY 
Kaiponanea T. Matsumura* 
 
In Obergefell v. Hodges, the United States Supreme Court recognized a 
constitutional right for same-sex couples to marry.  Although the decision is 
an important milestone in the struggle for equality, it also threatens to 
destabilize the relationships of those who previously entered into civil 
unions or domestic partnerships and may, for a variety of reasons, prefer 
not to trade their existing status for marriage.  That is because states have 
routinely responded to the legalization of same-sex marriage by eliminating 
their nonmarital statuses.  Some states have terminated such statuses and 
have required couples to opt into marriage to continue receiving the rights 
to which they had become accustomed.  Other states have converted the 
nonmarital statuses to marriages and have required couples wishing to 
avoid marriage to dissolve their legal relationships.  These actions have 
made it difficult—and in some cases practically impossible—for couples to 
choose not to marry. 
These state actions reveal the existence and scope of a right that has 
largely hidden in plain sight:  a right not to marry.  Although widely 
assumed to exist, courts have not yet found the occasion to invoke it.  But a 
flurry of cases culminating in the Obergefell decision compel the 
conclusion that the values supporting the right to marry also support a 
corollary right not to marry.  The terminations and conversions of 
nonmarital relationships bring this right not to marry into sharper focus 
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through the directness of their interventions and their impact on the choice 
to marry. 
 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1510 
I.  THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF NONMARITAL STATUSES ...................... 1514 
A.  Choosing Not to Marry ........................................................... 1515 
B.  State Responses to the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage ... 1518 
1.  Terminations .................................................................... 1520 
2.  Conversions ..................................................................... 1521 
II.  IS THERE A RIGHT NOT TO MARRY?.................................................. 1526 
A.  Rights to and Not to ................................................................ 1527 
B.  Valuing the Right to Marry ..................................................... 1528 
1.  Autonomy and Identity .................................................... 1530 
2.  Stability, Identity, and Identification ............................... 1534 
3.  Dignity ............................................................................. 1539 
C.  Valuing the Right Not to Marry .............................................. 1541 
III.  SITUATING THE RIGHT NOT TO MARRY ........................................... 1544 
A.  The Right on a Spectrum ......................................................... 1544 
B.  Exploring the Middle Ground ................................................. 1547 
1.  Automatically Converting Partnerships to Marriages ...... 1547 
2.  Terminating Statuses ........................................................ 1551 
3.  The Spectrum Revisited ................................................... 1555 
CONCLUSION:  BEYOND CONVERSIONS AND TERMINATIONS ................ 1556 
INTRODUCTION 
Dozens of states and scores of municipalities have created nonmarital 
statuses like civil unions and domestic partnerships for those who (until 
recently) could not, or chose not to, marry.  Tens of thousands of couples 
currently access a combination of rights and responsibilities through those 
statuses, ranging from employment benefits to hospital access to all of the 
other rights and responsibilities of marriage.1  Where same-sex couples 
have won the right to marry, however, jurisdictions have repeatedly treated 
that legalization as a green light to eliminate existing nonmarital statuses. 
Couples receiving state or local benefits through civil unions or domestic 
partnerships have sometimes been required to marry to continue receiving 
those benefits.  In Arizona, for example, a federal district court struck down 
the state’s opposite-sex marriage requirement in October 2014.2  Within a 
month, the state sent an email to its employees in same-sex domestic 
partnerships notifying them that “[b]ecause same-sex couples may now 
marry in Arizona, . . . same-sex domestic partners will no longer be eligible 
 
 1. See infra Part I.A. 
 2. Majors v. Horne, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1313 (D. Ariz. 2014). 
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for [health insurance] coverage . . . effective January 1, 2015.”3  That 
bureaucratic message was followed on December 11, 2014, by a more 
sharply worded email from an LGBT rights organization stating, in no 
uncertain terms, “If you have not married your same-sex domestic partner, 
and you wish to retain family benefits for your partner and/or partner’s 
children, you have until December 31, 2014 to marry.”4 
Other states have responded to the legalization of same-sex marriage by 
flat out converting nonmarital statuses like domestic partnerships and civil 
unions into marriages.  For example, the 2012 Washington marriage 
equality legislation provided registered same-sex domestic partners with 
three options.  Couples could marry on their own.  They could also dissolve 
their partnerships.  Or, if they did nothing, any partnerships in which a 
member was not over the age of sixty-two would automatically convert to 
marriages in the summer of 2014.5  Members of civil unions in the states of 
Connecticut,6 Delaware,7 and New Hampshire8 similarly saw their unions 
automatically converted when marriage became legal in their respective 
states. 
Both types of responses coerce the choice to marry.9  In the first 
situation, the state promises to strip the partners of valuable benefits unless 
they marry.  In the second, the partners are married by the state; they can 
only avoid marriage by choosing to surrender their existing legal rights in a 
divorce-like proceeding.10  It would be hard to characterize the choice to 
marry under these circumstances as freely made.  These situations have 
brought into sharp relief a set of questions overlooked in the rush to legalize 
 
 3. Email from ASU Benefits Communications to ASU Employees (Nov. 6, 2014, 11:25 
PDT) (on file with author). 
 4. Posting of Stephen Pratt, Stephen.Pratt@asu.edu, to Staff and Faculty Group 
Supporting Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Issues at ASU, UBIQUITY@asu.edu (Dec. 11, 2014, 
16:24 PDT) (on file with author). 
 5. See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 26.60.010 (2014). See also 2012 Wash. Sess. 
Laws 203 (“[A]ny state registered domestic partnership in which the parties are the same 
sex, and neither party is sixty-two years of age or older, that has not been dissolved or 
converted into a marriage by the parties by June 30, 2014, is automatically merged into a 
marriage and is deemed a marriage as of June 30, 2014.” (emphasis added)). 
 6. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38rr (2009) (converting existing civil unions to marriages 
after October 1, 2010); see also Act Implementing the Guarantee of Equal Protection, 2009 
Conn. Acts No. 9-13 § 12(a). 
 7. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 218 (2013); see also Civil Marriage Equality and 
Religious Freedom Act of 2013, 79 Del. Laws ch. 19, § 6 (2013). 
 8. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:46 (2010). 
 9. I use the term “state” here to refer to state actors in the constitutional sense.  In 
addition to states, both federal agencies and municipalities, for example, have announced 
plans to terminate existing domestic partner benefits. See infra note 13. 
 10. In Washington, for example, domestic partners would have to go through the same 
divorce proceedings as married couples unless the partnership met a restrictive set of 
requirements.  If neither partner had minor children, any ownership interest in real property, 
and unpaid obligations in excess of $4000, and if the net fair market value of the community 
assets fell below $25,000, the partners could bypass formal dissolution procedures as long as 
the partners could agree upon a division of assets and they also waived rights to 
maintenance. See Act Expanding Rights and Responsibilities for Domestic Partnerships, 
2008 Wash. Sess. Laws 122–123. 
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same-sex marriage:  Do people have a right not to marry?  If so, how might 
this right constrain the state? 
The resolution of these questions is a matter of great urgency given the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,11 invalidating state-
imposed same-sex marriage bans nationwide.12  If the approaches above are 
any indication of what is to come, thousands of partners will likely be told 
that they must marry to retain valuable employment benefits.  Thousands 
more could have their domestic partnerships or civil unions transformed 
into marriages with no affirmative choice on their part.  Indeed, some state 
actors are already calling for the elimination of their states’ nonmarital 
statuses.13 
Although no court has yet defined the contours of a right not to marry or 
even confirmed its existence,14 the terminations and conversions of 
nonmarital statuses provide the occasion to recognize such a right. 
State actions that compel marriage can be seen as falling on a spectrum 
from minimal interventions, like creating legal incentives for people to 
marry (for example, by providing favorable inheritance, tax, evidence, and 
tort rules to married couples), to maximal ones (like requiring marriage 
between unwilling participants).  These actions differ both in terms of the 
degree of coercion and the nature of state intervention. 
Depending on which state actions the right not to marry would prevent, 
that right can also be understood as falling along a spectrum.  For example, 
the recent framing of the right to marry in terms of “personal choice” and 
“individual autonomy”15 leaves little doubt that the Fourteenth Amendment 
would recognize, at the very least, some right not to marry—it is unlikely 
that the state could pair off unmarried strangers and deem them legally 
married over their objection.  One might further argue that any favorable 
treatment of married couples could impermissibly influence the choice to 
marry and therefore violate the right not to marry.  This would be an 
expansive right.  But history and precedent teach that states need not 
safeguard the choice to marry from any state encouragement. 
 
 11. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 12. Id. at 2607. 
 13. See Molly Beck, Wisconsin Lawmaker Calls for Repeal of State’s Domestic Partner 
Registry, WISC. ST. J. (June 27, 2015), http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-
politics/wisconsin-lawmaker-calls-for-repeal-of-state-s-domestic-partner/article_5bbf1b48-
f40a-5a4e-99d2-1f95e26cd7d0.html [https://perma.cc/S4YJ-EWU4]; Stephen Hudak, 
Orange County Repeals Same-Sex Benefits, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Oct. 20, 2015),  
http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/breaking-news/os-orange-repeals-same-sex-benefits-
20151020-story.html (noting the termination of domestic partner benefits provided by 
Orange County, Florida) [https://perma.cc/3VFN-M54Z]; Rebecca Kruth, Senator Wants 
Domestic Partners to “Put a Ring on It” or Lose State Benefits, MICH. RADIO (Oct. 5, 2015) 
http://michiganradio.org/post/senator-wants-domestic-partners-put-ring-it-or-lose-state-
benefits (discussing proposed legislation that would terminate domestic partner benefits for 
state employees); Michael K. Lavers, State Department to Phase Out DP Benefits, WASH. 
BLADE (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.washingtonblade.com/2015/10/19/exclusive-state-
department-to-phase-out-dp-benefits/ (reporting that the U.S. State Department would phase 
out domestic partner benefits starting in December 2015) [https://perma.cc/Y5X5-M3FX]. 
 14. See infra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 15. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597, 2599. 
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The elimination of nonmarital statuses shines a spotlight on a right that 
has been hiding in plain sight.  When jurisdictions like Arizona terminate 
existing benefits, they go from providing incentives to stripping rights 
around which couples structure their lives.16  The greater the package of 
existing rights, the more coercive the termination will be.  Automatic 
conversions raise even greater concerns.17  States like Washington marry 
the couple without any choice on their part and require the couple 
essentially to engage in self-harm in order to avoid marriage.  These 
features render the terminations and conversions constitutionally suspect.  
In short, when we ask “what state actions might the right not to marry 
prohibit?,” we now have some realistic candidates. 
I pause here to make a point about terminology.  When I refer to a “right 
not to marry,” I refer to the right to be free from state-imposed marriage as 
a matter of current U.S. constitutional doctrine.  The right, framed in this 
way, is a negative right.18  For example, the right could prevent states from 
converting existing domestic partnerships and civil unions to marriages, but 
would not require states to create or license new domestic partnerships or 
civil unions.  In contrast, some have suggested that the Constitution should 
affirmatively foster intimate relationships outside of marriage.19  To the 
extent that such a right would compel state recognition of nonmarital family 
forms or intimate relationships—in addition to preventing their 
termination—that right would seem to have both positive and negative 
dimensions.  Such a right—more of a “right to nonmarriage”20—is 
consistent with, and would encompass, the right not to marry, but lies 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
The analysis proceeds as follows.  Part I explains that people have 
different reasons for registering their relationships as domestic partnerships 
or civil unions, and not all who have done so desire marriage.  Nonetheless, 
many states have terminated those statuses or converted them to marriages.  
Part II examines whether the Fourteenth Amendment protects a right not to 
 
 16. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 17. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 18. See David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 
864, 864–66 (1986) (distinguishing between positive rights, which impose affirmative duties 
upon the government to protect those rights, and negative rights, which restrict states from 
depriving people of certain protections). 
 19. See Nan D. Hunter, Interpreting Liberty and Equality Through the Lens of Marriage, 
6 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 107, 111–12 (2015) (raising the question whether unmarried people will 
be able to argue for constitutional protections after Obergefell); Melissa Murray, 
Accommodating Nonmarriage, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 661 (2015); Catherine Powell, Up From 
Marriage:  Freedom, Solitude, and Individual Autonomy in the Shadow of Marriage 
Equality, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 69, 78 (2015) (arguing that the state should recognize 
“obligations toward nonmarital relationships as well as single individuals”).  These 
arguments differ from those that call for the state to recognize other forms of relationships 
but do not argue that the recognition is constitutionally compelled. See infra note 92. 
 20. See Ethan J. Leib, Hail Marriage and Farewell, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 41, 42 (2015) 
(noting the distinction between the right to marry, a negative right, and the right to marriage, 
a positive right); Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2089–94 
(2005) (concluding that the right to marry protects equal access to whatever rights a state 
elects to associate with marriage, rather than a positive right to marriage). 
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marry.  It first analyzes when and how a recognized “right to”—here, the 
right to marry—supports the existence of a heretofore unrecognized “right 
not to.”  It then reasons from the established right to marry to identify the 
constitutional values that the right not to marry should protect.  With this 
analysis in mind, Part III introduces a range of state actions that the right 
not to marry could possibly constrain and then identifies the right as a 
defensible, bounded part on that spectrum.  Having identified the scope of 
the right, Part III then argues that a right not to marry would protect against 
the conversion of nonmarital statuses to marriages and might also prevent 
states from terminating statuses when the circumstances would give rise to 
significant reliance on existing rights and obligations. 
I.  THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF NONMARITAL STATUSES 
The last several decades have witnessed a rapid expansion in state and 
local recognition of nonmarital statuses.  These relationships vary in terms 
of their composition (gender, age, conjugality),21 rights and responsibilities 
(from employment benefits to all the rights of marriage under state law),22 
and formality.  All told, tens of thousands (likely hundreds of thousands) of 
people, including same- and opposite-sex couples, are in official nonmarital 
statuses.23  Unsurprisingly, given the patchwork way in which these 
nonmarital statuses were created, individuals have had different motives for 
entering these relationships—some seeking nothing more than the benefits 
offered by the government and others seeking recognition and validation of 
their marriage-like relationships. 
 
 21. Compare CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (2012) (creating domestic partnerships for same-
sex couples and opposite-sex couples in which both persons are over the age of eighteen), 
with Illinois Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/10 
(2011) (opening the status to either same- or opposite-sex couples). 
 22. Compare BROWARD CTY., FLA. CODE art. VIII, § 16.5 (2002) (creating domestic 
partnerships offering couples rights to municipal employment benefits), with CAL. FAM. 
CODE § 297.5 (2007) (offering state domestic partnerships with nearly all of the rights and 
responsibilities of marriage provided by state law). 
 23. The actual number is likely in the hundreds of thousands.  In California, for 
example, 76,221 couples registered as domestic partners between 2000 and 2014; only 
10,138 were dissolved during the same time period. Email from Special Filings Unit, Cal. 
Sec’y of State, to author (Jan. 13, 2015, 15:26 PDT) (on file with author).  In Illinois, nearly 
5000 couples entered into civil unions between 2011 and 2012. See Kathy Catrambone, 
Nearly 5000 Same-Sex Civil Unions in First Year, DOWNERS GROVE PATCH (June 4, 2012), 
http://patch.com/illinois/downersgrove/hed-758ecc1d [https://perma.cc/ 
GJ5R-9N7G].  Oregon reports 5667 same-sex domestic partnerships between 2008 and 
2013. See Oregon Domestic Partnership Data, OR. HEALTH AUTH., https://public.health. 
oregon.gov/BirthDeathCertificates/VitalStatistics/dompart/Pages/index.aspx (last updated 
Oct. 8, 2015) [https://perma.cc/FNM3-4QSC].  Additionally, the Human Rights Campaign 
lists over eighty municipalities that offer domestic partner benefits of some kind. See City 
and County Domestic Partner Registries, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://hrc.org/resources/ 
entry/city-and-county-domestic-partner-registries (last updated June 18, 2015) [https:// 
perma.cc/MN27-6D37]. 
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A.  Choosing Not to Marry 
Marriage is still a goal for most people, even those in nonmarital 
statuses.24  Yet, for various reasons, some people may enter nonmarital 
statuses.25  Although the reasons may vary, they generally break into two 
categories:  legal consequences and personal beliefs. 
Couples may have financial or legal incentives for not marrying.  
Married couples are treated differently from unmarried couples—even 
though their nonmarital statuses approximate marriage—for federal income 
tax purposes.26  Married couples earning similar amounts are often subject 
to higher taxation than they would be if filing as single individuals.27  
Couples with nonmarital statuses, who remain partially invisible to the 
Internal Revenue Service, can avoid these negative consequences while at 
the same time benefiting from favorable property characterizations under 
state law.  California domestic partners, for example, divide their income 
equally but file taxes separately, meaning that a high earning partner could 
file based on a lower income and thereby pay lower federal taxes.28  
Married couples may also face a potential reduction in federal financial aid 
benefits like income-based loan repayment.29  Remarriage could trigger a 
variety of consequences, including eligibility for pension and Social 
Security benefits.30  Additionally, marriage might negatively affect spouses 
based on unique property ownership or debt issues.31 
 
 24. See D’Vera Cohn, Love and Marriage, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 13, 2013), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/02/13/love-and-marriage/ (“Most who never have 
been married say they would like to be at some point in their lives.”) [https://perma.cc/8UP9-
2K9E]; Opposite-Sex Civil Unions:  Motives for Not Marrying, COOK CTY. CLERK, 
http://www.cookcountyclerk.com/newsroom/newsfromclerk/Documents/Opposite%20Sex%
20Civil%20Union%20Report%20Final%2012.19.11.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) 
[hereinafter Motives for Not Marrying] (noting that many Illinois civil union registrants still 
plan to marry) [https://perma.cc/DM6D-VHCH]. 
 25. Some scholars have performed a careful analysis of the differences between 
nonmarriage and marriage. See, e.g., Erez Aloni, Deprivative Recognition, 61 UCLA L. REV. 
1276 (2014).  Here, though, I focus on the differences between nonmarital statuses (like 
municipal or state domestic partnerships) and formal marriage. 
 26. See Patricia A. Cain, Taxation of Same-Sex Couples After United States v. Windsor:  
Did the IRS Get It Right in Revenue Ruling 2013-17?, 6 ELON L. REV. 269, 294 (2014). 
 27. Laura Saunders, Same-Sex Couples and the Marriage Penalty, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 
19, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487035616045761503328198 
19692 (explaining various manifestations of the “marriage penalty”) [https://perma.cc/63X6-
KKSW]. 
 28. See id. (using the example of partners earning $225,000 and $20,000 to realize 
annual tax savings of $3144 as compared to a married couple). 
 29. Income-based loan repayment caps the required monthly payments on major types of 
federal student loans based on debt-to-income ratio. See Megan Slack, Income Based 
Repayment:  Everything You Need to Know (June 7, 2012), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/06/07/income-based-repayment-everything-you-
need-know [https://perma.cc/TBG5-VNYN].  When an individual marries, both spouses’ 
incomes are used to calculate eligibility. Id.; see also Inga Nelson, Note, Recognition of Civil 
Unions and Domestic Partnerships As Marriages in Same-Sex Marriage States, 98 MINN. L. 
REV. 1171, 1198 (2014). 
 30. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.60.010 (2014) (noting that “some social security 
and pension laws . . . make it impractical for [couples in which one member is over the age 
of sixty-two] to marry”).  Although some federal and state consequences kick in because of 
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Just as important, some people simply do not want to marry for 
ideological or religious reasons.  As Professor Elizabeth Scott has observed, 
Even today, marriage has not fully emerged as a secular legal status.  
Vestiges of the religious origins of marriage continue to shape attitudes 
and inform the views of many marriage defenders, and cause concern for 
those who are committed to secular legal institutions.  Second, traditional 
marriage was a deeply hierarchical institution, in which wives were 
legally and socially subordinated to their husbands . . . .  Thus, it is not 
surprising that many feminists have little enthusiasm for marriage.32 
Scholars within the LGBT community have also resisted marriage for 
similar reasons.  Over two decades ago, Professor Nancy Polikoff opposed 
the same-sex marriage agenda because it would “detract from, even 
contradict, efforts to unhook economic benefits from marriage” and would 
also “require a rhetorical strategy that emphasizes similarities between 
[same-sex] relationships and heterosexual marriages, values long-term 
monogamous coupling above all other relationships, and denies the 
potential of lesbian and gay marriage to transform the gendered nature of 
marriage for all people.”33 
Opposition to marriage is not confined to legal academics.  When Illinois 
created civil unions and opened them to both same- and opposite-sex 
couples, the Cook County Clerk’s office surveyed opposite-sex couples to 
ask why they had chosen civil unions over marriages.34  Of the forty-six 
people who responded, twelve identified “political/ideological” and four 
identified “religious issues” as their primary reason.35  In follow-up 
interviews with some of the survey participants, Professor John Culhane 
noticed a pattern of strong views against marriage, with participants 
reporting sentiments like a desire not to “fall[] into any preconditioned 
behavior” about gender roles, or a commitment to demonstrating that other 
family structures deserve respect.36  A New York Times article published 
two days after the Supreme Court’s Obergefell decision featured interviews 
of several couples personally opposed to marriage but who feared the 
 
age, remarriage could affect the performance of private agreements for people regardless of 
age. 
 31. See Steve Branton, After Gay Marriage Ruling, What Financial Steps Should 
Couples Take?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 3, 2015), http://www.csmonitor.com/ 
Business/Saving-Money/2015/0703/After-gay-marriage-ruling-what-financial-steps-should-
couples-take [https://perma.cc/MWH4-DLGA]. 
 32. Elizabeth S. Scott, A World Without Marriage, 41 FAM. L.Q. 537, 538 (2007) 
(citation omitted). 
 33. Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For:  Why Legalizing Gay and 
Lesbian Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage”, 
79 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1549 (1993). 
 34. See Motives for Not Marrying, supra note 24. 
 35. See id. 
 36. John Culhane, No to Nuptials, SLATE (Jan. 3, 2012), http://www.slate.com/articles/ 
news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/01/are_states_that_experiment_with_opposite_sex_ci
vil_unions_offering_a_way_to_opt_out_of_oppressive_ideas_about_marriage_.html 
[https://perma.cc/672Y-QGFJ]. 
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impact of the decision on their future ability to retain benefits.37  We do not 
know how many of the 6.8 million unmarried-couple households in the 
United States38 share this opposition to marriage, but even a small 
percentage would amount to a significant number of people who remain 
unmarried by choice.39 
From time to time, people may also seek to enter a nonmarital 
relationship but choose not to marry for religious reasons.  A gay Catholic, 
for example, might believe that marriage should be reserved for 
heterosexuals.40  Recognizing that people holding such beliefs might want 
certain legal protections for their relationships without marrying, the 
Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales opposed a proposal to 
automatically convert same-sex civil partnerships into marriages.41  Some 
Jewish people believe that, regardless of civil divorce, a woman cannot 
remarry without obtaining a get from her husband.42  It stands to reason that 
a woman without a get might register a nonmarital relationship for the 
purpose of obtaining certain legal benefits without wanting to face the 
religious consequences of remarrying.43 
 
 37. Tara Siegel Bernard, Fate of Domestic Partner Benefits in Question After Marriage 
Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/29/your-money/fate-
of-domestic-partner-benefits-in-question-after-marriage-ruling.html?_r=0 
[http://perma.cc/8KR3-GZE4]; see also Cara Buckley, Gay Couples, Choosing to Say ‘I 
Don’t’, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/27/style/gay-couples-
choosing-to-say-i-dont.html (reporting that “[p]lenty of gay couples do not want to marry” 
for a variety of reasons including moral opposition, financial burdens, and the prospect of 
divorce) [https://perma.cc/FAL8-BEEZ]. 
 38. See Unmarried and Single Americans Week Sept. 16–22, 2012, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/facts_for_features_special_ 
editions/cb12-ff18.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) [https://perma.cc/S8SY-WC8B]. 
 39. In France, for example, there are two civil unions (pacte civil de solidarite, or PACS) 
for every three marriages, most of them straight couples. See Scott Sayare & Maia de la 
Baume, In France, Civil Unions Gain Favor over Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/world/europe/16france.html [http://perma.cc/3VRB-
BLPL].  Civil unions may never gain the popularity they have attained in France, but the 
French experience points to at least some degree of unmet need in this country. 
 40. See, e.g., Mark Oppenheimer, A Gay Catholic Voice Against Same-Sex Marriage, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/05/us/05beliefs.html [http:// 
perma.cc/6W35-JD93]. 
 41. Don’t Convert Same-Sex Civil Partnerships Automatically into Marriages, Urge 
Bishops, CATHOLIC HERALD (May 22, 2014), http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/news/2014/ 
05/22/dont-automatically-convert-same-sex-civil-partnerships-into-marriages-urge-bishops/ 
[https://perma.cc/ML6P-NLBZ]. 
 42. See Irving Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah:  A Study in Halacha, Contract, and 
the First Amendment, 51 MD. L. REV. 312, 313 & n.2 (1992) (“The get is a written bill of 
divorce that a husband or his agent must physically hand over to his wife or her agent in the 
presence of witnesses.”). 
 43. Barbara J. Redman, Note, Jewish Divorce:  What Can Be Done in Secular Courts to 
Aid the Jewish Woman?, 19 GA. L. REV. 389, 390 (1985) (noting that the consequence of a 
wife’s failure to obtain a religious, as opposed to secular, divorce under Jewish law is that 
any subsequent remarriage would render her an adulteress). 
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B.  State Responses to the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage 
Despite their differences, nonmarital relationships—from municipal 
registries, to state employment benefits, to state alternatives to marriage—
all exist in what Professor Douglas NeJaime has called a “dialogical 
relationship” with marriage44:  these statuses arose in the shadow of, in 
imitation of, and sometimes in opposition to, the institution of marriage.45  
The arrival of nationwide marriage equality therefore calls into question 
their reasons for being and leaves their future existence in jeopardy. 
Many jurisdictions have already phased out existing nonmarital statuses 
like domestic partnerships and civil unions or are moving in that 
direction.46  These jurisdictions have not only closed the statuses to future 
registrants, but have eliminated them altogether.47  Others have, for now, 
decided to retain existing statuses.  For example, the California legislature 
has made no move to terminate existing domestic partnerships or to close 
its registry to future domestic partners even though same-sex marriage has 
been legal for over two years.48 
Nevertheless, there is lingering uncertainty even in those states that had 
previously preserved their statuses now that marriage equality is available 
nationwide.  California did not eliminate its same-sex-only domestic 
partnerships after the legalization of same-sex marriage in the summer of 
2013.  Although the domestic partnership regime is vulnerable to the claim 
that it discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation, it was retained 
because uncertainty about the recognition of the state’s same-sex marriages 
across the country justified an additional safeguard for same-sex couples.  
With that uncertainty removed by the Obergefell decision,49 it remains to be 
seen whether legislators will choose to remedy this sexual orientation 
discrimination by opening domestic partnerships to all or eliminating 
them.50  The apparent leveling of the marriage playing field51 might tempt 
legislators to “clean up” or streamline their family law regimes.52 
 
 44. Douglas NeJaime, Before Marriage:  The Unexplored History of Nonmarital 
Recognition and Its Relationship to Marriage, 102 CAL. L. REV. 87, 111 (2014). 
 45. See id. at 121–54; see also id. at 163–64 (noting that nonmarital statuses also 
influenced the development of marital norms); Melissa Murray, Paradigms Lost:  How 
Domestic Partnership Went from Innovation to Injury, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
291, 294–96 (2013). 
 46. See supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See Frequently Asked Questions, CAL. SEC’Y OF ST., http://www.sos.ca.gov/registries 
/domestic-partners-registry/frequently-asked-questions (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) (“The 
Court’s ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges did not invalidate or change any of the California 
Family Code sections related to registered domestic partners.”) [https://perma.cc/8GMH-
HWFK]. 
 49. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (“[T]here is no lawful basis for a 
State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State.”). 
 50. See Jonathan D. Evans, Domestic Partnerships in Doubt?, DAILY J., July 7, 2015, at 
6–7.  In Holguin v. Flores, the court noted that “a legislative enactment or constitutional 
decision authorizing same-sex couples to marry (while also continuing to permit them the 
alternative of registering as domestic partners)” could give opposite-sex couples “a stronger 
claim of discriminatory treatment under the existing wrongful death provisions.” 18 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 749, 759 n.60 (Ct. App. 2004) (rejecting an age and sexual orientation 
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The nature of the governmental body that created the nonmarital status, 
and that body’s motivations for creating it, will likely influence lawmakers’ 
decisions on whether and how to eliminate it.  Municipalities and states that 
created domestic partnerships as a way to create some parity for same-sex 
couples might no longer see the need to provide those benefits to the 
unmarried.  Those states like Colorado, Hawaii, and Illinois that legislated 
nonmarital statuses as an alternative to marriage, even for couples that 
could choose to marry, might be less inclined to eliminate those statuses.53  
At the end of the day, however, this Article does not seek to predict the next 
jurisdictions likely to eliminate their nonmarital statuses, but to study the 
effect of the elimination on the registrants.54 
These eliminations have taken two basic forms.  Some jurisdictions have 
simply terminated existing statuses, encouraging couples to opt into 
marriage if they want to retain their existing legal rights.  Other 
jurisdictions have chosen to convert alternate statuses to marriages and have 
required couples to opt out if they do not want to be married.  The 
following sections illustrate these approaches. 
 
discrimination challenge to the state’s wrongful death statute on the grounds that domestic 
partners lacked the right to marry).  Those developments have come to pass. Cf. Michael 
Dresser & Carrie Wells, With Same-Sex Marriage Now Available, State to End Benefits for 
Domestic Partners, BALT. SUN (May 3, 2013), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-05-
03/features/bs-md-domestic-benefits-20130502_1_domestic-partners-health-benefits-state-
employees (quoting the executive director of Equality Maryland as saying, “We would like 
to see domestic partnership benefits on the books for same-sex couples until there’s a level 
playing field with regard to marriage” on a nationwide level (emphasis added)) 
[https://perma.cc/2DSV-PXXM]. 
 51. Strong arguments remain that the lack of antidiscrimination protections for 
individuals on the basis of sexual orientation makes the leveling of the playing field more 
apparent than real.  A person may not be able to freely exercise the choice to marry a same-
sex partner if that decision will make him vulnerable to discrimination in the workplace or in 
public accommodations. See Erik Eckholm, Next Fight for Gay Rights:  Bias in Jobs and 
Housing, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/us/gay-rights-
leaders-push-for-federal-civil-rights-protections.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/L9W7-M7AP]; 
Mark Joseph Stern, Gay Couples May Soon Have to Choose Between Getting Married and 
Not Getting Fired, SLATE (July 3, 2014), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2014/07/03/ 
gay_couples_may_soon_have_marriage_rights_but_still_face_discrimination.html [https:// 
perma.cc/6Y2G-GPZH]. 
 52. See supra note 13 (noting decisions by counties, states, and federal agencies to 
terminate nonmarital statuses). 
 53. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-22-101 (2015); HAW. REV. STAT. § 572B-1 (2012); 
Illinois Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/1 
(2011). 
 54. In the years leading up to the Obergefell decision, several scholars speculated as to 
whether the legalization of same-sex marriage would lead to the elimination of alternate 
statuses. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE:  CIVIL UNIONS AND THE 
FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS 121 (2002) (predicting that the creation of nonmarital statuses in the 
shadow of marriage would have a “sedimentary” effect); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Family 
Law Pluralism:  The Guided-Choice Regime of Menus, Default Rules, and Override Rules, 
100 GEO. L.J. 1881, 1966–67 (2012) (noting the circumstances under which jurisdictions 
have either maintained or terminated nonmarital statuses); Nancy D. Polikoff, What 
Marriage Equality Arguments Portend for Domestic Partner Employee Benefits, 37 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 49 (2013); Jeffrey A. Redding, Dignity, Legal Pluralism, and Same-
Sex Marriage, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 791, 794–95 n.12 (2010) (arguing that marriage has 
usually been accompanied by “erasure” of alternate statuses). 
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1.  Terminations 
Some states have begun to phase out their recognition of nonmarital 
statuses by terminating those statuses and requiring couples to marry—or 
opt in—in order to keep the benefits they have enjoyed. 
An example comes from the state of Arizona.  In 2008, the state initially 
provided subsidized health benefits to an employee’s domestic partner, 
defined as someone “of the same or opposite gender” who, among other 
things, had cohabited with the employee for at least a year and who could 
demonstrate financial interdependence.55  To obtain coverage for a partner, 
a state employee would submit a “Qualified Domestic Partner Affidavit” to 
prove that the enrollment requirements were met.56  Once approved by the 
Arizona Department of Administration, the partner would remain eligible 
barring a “qualified life event” such as dissolution, death, or remarriage.57  
Distinct from marriage-like regimes offering a collection of legal rights and 
responsibilities, domestic partnerships only offered the single, albeit 
valuable, benefit of state employment benefits.58 
However, in 2009, the state legislature eliminated coverage for domestic 
partners.59  Both same-sex and opposite-sex partners were affected by this 
legislation.  Following this development, Lambda Legal (“Lambda”), the 
prominent LGBT legal rights organization, filed suit on behalf of the same-
sex couples, but not opposite-sex couples, whose benefits were 
threatened.60  By representing only same-sex couples, Lambda was able to 
 
 55. Collins v. Brewer, 727 F. Supp. 2d 797, 800 (D. Ariz. 2010); see also Diaz v. 
Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 2011).  To demonstrate financial interdependence, the 
employee would have to provide proof of three of the following: 
i. Having a joint mortgage, joint property tax identification, or joint tenancy on a 
residential lease; ii. Holding one or more credit or bank accounts jointly, such as a 
checking account, in both names; iii. Assuming joint liabilities; iv. Having joint 
ownership of significant property, such as real estate, a vehicle, or a boat; v. 
Naming the partner as beneficiary on the employee’s life insurance, under the 
employee’s will, or employee’s retirement annuities and being named by the 
partner as beneficiary of the partner’s life insurance, under the partner’s will, or 
the partner’s retirement annuities; and vi. Each agreeing in writing to assume 
financial responsibility for the welfare of the other, such as durable power of 
attorney; or vii. Other proof of financial interdependence as approved by the 
Director. 
Collins, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 800. 
 56. See, e.g., Qualified Domestic Partner Affidavit, Arizona State University (on file 
with author). 
 57. See id.; see also, e.g., 2014 Benefits Enrollment/Change Form, Arizona State 
University (on file with author). 
 58. See Collins, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 800 (noting that the benefits “are commonly valued 
‘at between one-fifth and one-third of total compensation’”). 
 59. See Diaz, 656 F.3d at 1010. 
 60. See generally Amended Complaint at 2, Collins, 727 F. Supp. 2d 797 (No. 09-2402) 
(identifying plaintiffs as lesbian and gay employees with “committed same-sex life 
partner[s]”).  Professor Nancy Polikoff has speculated that this decision was motivated by 
Lambda’s efforts to win marriage equality nationwide and the need to maintain conceptual 
and rhetorical consistency regarding the superiority of marriage over other statuses. See 
Nancy D. Polikoff, “Two Parts of the Landscape of Family in America”:  Maintaining Both 
2016] A RIGHT NOT TO MARRY 1521 
advance the ultimately successful argument that its clients, unlike 
heterosexual couples, were precluded from choosing to marry and thus 
unfairly targeted by the Arizona legislation.61  The Ninth Circuit embraced 
this distinction in its equal protection analysis, noting that “different-sex 
couples wishing to retain their current family health benefits could alter 
their status—marry—to do so.  The Arizona Constitution, however, 
prohibits same-sex couples from doing so.”62 
One might predict, as a consequence of this analysis, that Arizona would 
demand that same-sex couples marry if marriage ever became available to 
them.  That event came to pass when Arizona’s same-sex marriage ban was 
struck down several years later, in October 2014.63  Within a month, same-
sex employees who had been receiving domestic partner benefits received 
an email notifying them that “[b]ecause same-sex couples may now marry 
in Arizona, . . . same-sex domestic partners will no longer be eligible for 
coverage . . . effective January 1, 2015.”64  That cryptically worded email 
providing under two months for domestic partners to marry was followed 
on December 11, 2014, by an email from Lambda attorneys stating, in no 
uncertain terms, “If you have not married your same-sex domestic partner, 
and you wish to retain family benefits for your partner and/or partner’s 
children, you have until December 31, 2014 to marry.”65 
Arizona’s response to the legalization of same-sex marriage reveals some 
of the tradeoffs involved in the adoption of an opt-in approach.  As the 
program was initially designed, same-sex couples would continue to receive 
benefits until the occurrence of a narrow range of qualified life events.  
Same-sex partners therefore had an expectation in the continuity of their 
benefits that the elimination of domestic partnerships would disturb. 
However, especially in light of the Ninth Circuit’s embrace of Lambda’s 
legal argument, the choice to marry would seem like an adequate (or even 
superior) alternative for those couples seeking to continue their benefits.  
And lawmakers appear to assume that an opt-in rule could remedy the 
harms that might follow from the elimination of domestic partnerships. 
2.  Conversions 
The opt-in option is not the only possible response for states eliminating 
nonmarital statuses.  Some states have chosen instead to make marriage the 
default rule and have required unwilling couples to opt out of the status.  
States choosing this path have converted marriage-like statuses, like civil 
unions and registered domestic partnerships, into marriages. 
 
Spousal and Domestic Partner Employee Benefits for Both Same-Sex and Different-Sex 
Couples, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 735, 746–47 (2012). 
 61. See id. at 741–42. 
 62. Diaz, 656 F.3d at 1014. 
 63. See Majors v. Horne, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1313 (D. Ariz. 2014). 
 64. Email from ASU Benefits Communications, supra note 3. 
 65. Posting of Stephen Pratt, supra note 4. 
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The state of Washington has adopted this approach.66  Washington 
initially passed domestic partner legislation in 2007.67  The state created a 
domestic partner registry granting registrants the right to visit a partner in 
the hospital and make medical decisions on his behalf, inherit a partner’s 
property without a will, and sue for the partner’s wrongful death.68  
Advocates hoped, and opponents feared, that the legislation would be a step 
on the pathway to marriage equality.69  The primary sponsors of the 
legislation, state legislators Ed Murray and Jamie Pedersen, never hid this 
agenda from their colleagues.70  At the same time, however, media 
coverage highlighted the fact that domestic partnerships offered only a 
limited handful of rights granted to married couples,71 and the legislation 
itself stated that “[t]his act does not affect marriage.”72 
The legislature soon amended the domestic partnership law to add 
additional rights and obligations.  Approximately a year after domestic 
partners were first allowed to register, the legislature added community 
property rights retroactive to the date of registration and made domestic 
partnerships subject to the same dissolution process as marriages (with 
limited exceptions).73 
For state law purposes,74 domestic partnerships essentially became 
marriage by a different name.  In 2012, however, the legislature made the 
final push to legalize same-sex marriage.75  The legislation eliminated 
gender-specific terms and defined marriage as “a civil contract between two 
persons.”76  It simultaneously redefined the entrance requirements for 
 
 66. I chose Washington for several reasons.  First, it is the most recent example to date 
of a legislative decision to convert domestic partnerships to marriages.  Second, and more 
importantly, none of the states that converted alternative statuses to marriage have useful, 
easily accessible legislative history materials explaining why they insisted on conversion. 
But I was able to speak to one of the two primary drafters of the Washington same-sex 
marriage legislation and therefore have more insights into the process as it unfolded in that 
state.  Finally, Washington’s approach to legalizing same-sex marriage was incremental and 
sheds light on other states that made incremental advances, like California. 
 67. 2007 Wash. Sess. Laws 616. 
 68. See id.; see also S.B. REP., S.B. 5336, at 3 (2007) (summarizing provisions). 
 69. See, e.g., John Iwasaki, Domestic Partners Line Up for Rights, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER (July 20, 2007), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Domestic-partners-
line-up-for-rights-1244293.php [http://perma.cc/EC99-G7XJ]. 
 70. Telephone Interview with State Senator Jamie Pedersen (Apr. 29, 2015).  Senator 
Pedersen felt that their incremental strategy depended on maintaining credibility with their 
colleagues, hence their forthrightness. 
 71. See Andrew Garber, A Festive Scene in Olympia Today As Domestic Partners 
Register, SEATTLE TIMES (July 23, 2007), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/a-
festive-scene-in-olympia-today-as-domestic-partners-register/ (discussing the limited 
“handful of rights” provided by the legislation) [https://perma.cc/X9TX-ZJQK]; Iwasaki, 
supra note 69 (“[D]omestic partnership ‘comes with far fewer benefits than marriage.’”). 
 72. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.60.010 (2014). 
 73. See 2008 Wash. Sess. Laws 53–76; WASH. B. ANALYSIS, H.B. 3104 (2008) 
(summarizing provisions). 
 74. Before and after Windsor, the federal government refused to treat domestic 
partnerships as marriages for purposes of federal law. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
2675 (2013). 
 75. 2012 Wash. Sess. Laws 199–205. 
 76. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010. 
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domestic partnerships, limiting that status to relationships in which “one of 
the persons is at least sixty-two years of age.”77  Finally, it created three 
options for same-sex couples no longer satisfying the requirements for a 
domestic partnership:  they could either “apply and receive a marriage 
license and have such marriage solemnized,” which would replace the 
existing partnership with a marriage; they could dissolve their partnerships 
and become legal strangers; or they could do nothing until June 30, 2014, at 
which point their partnership would be “automatically merged into a 
marriage and [would be] deemed a marriage.”78  The legislation also 
required the state to mail two notices to registered partners notifying them 
about the impending conversion of their partnerships to marriages.79 
Based on this chain of events, the single affirmative choice by a couple in 
2007 to enter into a domestic partnership with a limited set of rights could 
lead to today’s legal conclusion that the couple was legally married as of 
that date, with no additional action on their part.  We know that a subset of 
these couples would not have chosen to marry, either because of their views 
about marriage or their desire to avoid some of its legal implications.80  
Nonetheless, some of these couples did not dissolve their partnerships and 
were therefore married against their wishes.  How did the legislators justify 
this outcome? 
The answer is that they relied heavily on the concept of notice to remedy 
the lack of formal choice.  The state twice notified partners that they could 
step off the train—in 2008 when the state added community property and 
formal dissolution81 and in 2012 when the state provided for the conversion 
of partnerships to marriages.82  The first notice provided partners with the 
choice to dissolve their partnerships or accept significantly greater rights 
and responsibilities.83  The second notice presented registered partners with 
the three choices discussed above:  “[g]et married,” “[d]issolve your 
 
 77. Id. § 26.60.010. 
 78. Id. § 26.60.100 (2012).  In either case, the date of marriage for purposes of 
determining legal rights and responsibilities would be backdated to the date the partners 
registered their partnerships. Id. § 26.60.100(4). 
 79. 2012 Wash. Sess. Laws 205. 
 80. See, e.g., Paige Browning, Washington to Convert Domestic Partners to ‘Married’ 
in June, OPB (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.opb.org/news/article/washington-to-convert-
domestic-partners-to-married-in-june/ (interviewing a woman who never intended to marry 
her partner but acquiesced to marriage) [https://perma.cc/X9LJ-2LMA]; Chris Henry, Same-
Sex Domestic Partnerships Will Convert to Marriage in 2014, KITSAP SUN (Nov. 25, 2012), 
http://www.kitsapsun.com/news/local/same-sex-domestic-partnerships-will-convert-to-
marriage-in-2014-ep-416874597-356402161.html (“The committee [drafting the bill] 
actually heard from some younger couples who want nothing to do with marriage, an 
institution they see as tainted throughout history.”) [http://perma.cc/T4F7-K528]; Lornet 
Turnbull, State to Same-Sex Domestic Partners:  You’re About to Be Married, SEATTLE 
TIMES (Feb. 15, 2014), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/state-to-same-sex-domestic 
-partners-yoursquore-about-to-be-married/ (interviewing the president of the LGBT bar 
association, who said that many couples across the state were unaware of the conversion to 
marriages and some had “signed up for the minimum”) [https://perma.cc/3MFS-RVAW]. 
 81. See 2008 Wash. Sess. Laws 53–76, 122–155. 
 82. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.60.100 (2012). 
 83. See 2008 Wash. Sess. Laws 25. 
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domestic partnership,” or “[d]o nothing, which would mean that . . . your 
domestic partnership [would] automatically convert.”84 
But questions remain about actual notice.85  Not all registered couples 
updated the addresses they provided when they registered their 
partnerships.  As a result, hundreds of previous notices had been returned 
undelivered.86  An official working in the Secretary of State’s office 
admitted that the failure to inform all registered partners of the conversion 
was inevitable:  “They’re living quiet lives someplace and don’t know all of 
this is happening.”87 
The legislators also assumed that the availability of dissolution 
procedures—akin to judicially supervised divorce—would provide an 
adequate remedy for those not wishing to marry.88  We might expect, 
however, that the higher emotional and practical costs of choosing to marry 
or dissolve the partnership would channel people to the path of least 
resistance:  doing nothing at all.89  And in fact, in the days leading up to the 
 
 84. Eli Sanders, What Happens If I’m Already Domestic Partnered in Washington State?  
What Happens If I Live Here But Was Gay Married in Another State? Answers! Answers! 
Answers!, STRANGER (Nov. 8, 2012), http://slog.thestranger.com/slog/archives/2012/11/08/ 
what-happens-if-im-already-domestic-partnered-in-washington-state-what-happens-if-i-live-
here-but-was-gay-married-in-another-state-answers (quoting Sen. Pedersen) [https://perma. 
cc/B6HX-J49X]. 
 85. Washington’s conversion raises many unanswered questions about notice.  
Typically, the legislature is not obligated to provide affirmative notice of changes in the law, 
and people are presumed to have knowledge of current legal obligations. See, e.g., Torres v. 
INS, 144 F.3d 472, 474 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Ignorance of a statute is generally no defense even 
to a criminal prosecution, and it is never a defense in a civil case, no matter how recent, 
obscure, or opaque the statute.”).  On the other hand, the concept of notice is not irrelevant 
when assessing whether legislation is fundamentally fair. See Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and 
Legal Change:  An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1066 (1997).  As 
Professor Fisch explains, “When Congress affirmatively invites parties to structure their 
transactions in reliance on existing legal rules, changing these rules without notice and an 
opportunity to mitigate the effects of the change violates important due process principles.” 
Id. at 1107.  In the context of litigation, “[p]ersonal service of written notice within the 
jurisdiction is the classic form of notice always adequate in any type of proceeding.” 
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). 
 86. See Turnbull, supra note 80. 
 87. Most Washington Domestic Partnerships to Convert to Marriages Under State’s 
Same-Sex Marriage Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS, (June 29, 2014), http://www.oregonlive.com/ 
pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/2014/06/washingtons_domestic_partnersh.html [https:// 
perma.cc/GL7B-S2QA].  Unwitting convertees face significant legal consequences:  a future 
marriage may subject the convertee to charges of bigamy, see WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 9A.64.010 (2011) (“A person is guilty of bigamy if he or she intentionally marries or 
purports to marry another person when either person has a living spouse.”), and those 
escaping prosecution may still have relied to their detriment on the existence of an illegal 
subsequent marriage, see Elia-Warnken v. Elia, 972 N.E.2d 17, 22 (Mass. 2012) (holding 
that a same-sex partner’s undissolved civil union rendered a subsequent marriage void ab 
initio). 
 88. See 2008 Wash. Sess. Laws 122–55. 
 89. The negative consequences of the decision to opt out make this rule what Professor 
William Eskridge would call a “hard default”:  a default rule (in this case marriage) that is 
difficult to override, making the rule little different from a mandatory rule. See Eskridge, 
supra note 54, at 1902. 
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mandatory conversion, approximately 60 percent of registered domestic 
partners had not affirmatively opted into marriage.90 
An opt-out approach like Washington’s might be preferable as a 
majoritarian default, but it also involves tradeoffs.  Under an opt-out rule, 
parties need not formally choose to marry.  Rather, their earlier choice to 
register for an alternative status becomes the basis for the state designating 
a couple as married.  This rule raises several questions:  Can we can treat as 
married two people who have not formally made that choice?  Can the law 
substitute its own judgment about marital choice for people who are 
indifferent to marriage?  And for those who would not otherwise choose to 
be married, does an opt-out option that imposes burdensome consequences 
like judicially supervised dissolution penalize partners who pursue that 
option? 
*     *     * 
Terminations and conversions both push people toward marriage, but 
they do so in different ways.  Terminations do not transform a nonmarital 
relationship into a marriage; they instead treat marriage as a substitute for 
the legal rights that are being taken away.  The varied sources and substance 
of those rights could affect the impact of the termination on the decision to 
marry.  A municipality, for example, lacks the power to offer state-provided 
legal rights like inheritance rights or tort remedies.  A state might recognize 
nonmarital relationships for the limited purpose of providing employment 
benefits to state employees or might create a status more akin to marriage.  
These differences will influence how the partners view the significance of 
their choices to enter the relationship and the extent of their reliance on the 
package of legal rights provided by their nonmarital statuses. 
Conversions, on the other hand, move people from the category of 
nonmarriage to marriage.  As is the case with terminations, partners must 
marry in order to retain their existing legal rights.  Here, though, they do not 
need to choose marriage, but can instead acquiesce to it.  The adoption of 
an opt-out approach therefore results in a number of married couples who 
did not choose to marry in the traditional sense.91  Moreover, conversions 
require those who do not wish to marry to dissolve their partnerships in 
order to avoid marriage.  The requirement that a couple end its legal 
relationship would seem a strong inducement to accept marriage. 
A jurisdiction’s decision to eliminate a nonmarital status through either 
an opt-in or opt-out approach raises concerns about a person’s choice to 
 
 90. The Impact (TVW television broadcast June 26, 2014), http://sdc.wastateleg.org/ 
pedersen/news (interview of Sen. Pedersen at 11:45) [https://perma.cc/UK8Z-7WD7].  The 
Washington Secretary of State currently (as of 2015) reports 3316 “married Domestic 
Partner registrations,” 3311 “converted to marriage Domestic Partnership registrations,” and 
1367 “terminated Domestic Partnership registrations.” Domestic Partnerships, SEC’Y OF ST., 
CORP., https://www.sos.wa.gov/corps/domesticpartnerships/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/433F-DWC4]. 
 91. This situation begs the question what exactly the law of a particular jurisdiction 
requires with respect to the choice to marry.  I will explore that question more fully in future 
work. 
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marry or not to marry to varying degrees.  The next part of this Article 
explores what, if anything, the Constitution says about this. 
II.  IS THERE A RIGHT NOT TO MARRY? 
Legal scholars have long argued for the legal recognition of different 
forms of family relationships, intimate or otherwise.92  They have also 
highlighted court decisions disaggregating rights, like the right to establish 
a parent-child relationship or to engage in private, consensual sexual 
conduct, once subsumed by the marital relationship—what Professor 
Melissa Murray has called a “jurisprudence of non-marriage.”93  But few 
have gone so far as to argue that the right not to marry is a right protected 
by the U.S. Constitution.  When the right has been invoked at all (and it has 
been invoked rarely), scholars and advocates have painted in broad 
brushstrokes, arguing, for example, that pegging various legal benefits to 
marital status violates the right of single people and cohabitants not to 
marry,94 or assuming that the two-way nature of constitutional rights would 
compel the existence of both the right to, and not to, marry.95  And thus far, 
no court has embraced the right not to marry or defined its precise 
contours.96 
 
 92. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL 
FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 226–36 (1995) (calling for the 
abolition of marriage and the recognition of “nurturing units”); NANCY D. POLIKOFF, 
BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE:  VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 123–35 
(2008) (advocating for recognition of nonmarital partnerships, designated family 
relationships, and other relationships based on caregiving); Jessica R. Feinberg, Avoiding 
Marriage Tunnel Vision, 88 TUL. L. REV. 257, 260 (2013) (advocating for pluralistic 
relationship recognition in addition to marriage equality); Murray, supra note 45, at 303–04 
(noting the need for “different model[s] of rights and regulation” outside of marriage).  
These discussions have focused primarily on policy arguments for the recognition of 
alternate statuses and not on the question of whether the Constitution would prevent states 
from taking those statuses away.  As Professor Douglas NeJaime has observed, that question 
has not been answered. Douglas NeJaime, Windsor’s Right Not to Marry, 123 YALE L.J. 
ONLINE 219, 248 (2013) (predicting that a Supreme Court opinion reinscribing the superior 
status of marriage (as the Obergefell opinion did) would prompt us to ask “whether there is a 
meaningful right not to marry”). 
 93. Melissa Murray, Obergefell v. Hodges and the New Marriage Inequality, CAL. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 4, 10–18) (on file with author); see also Serena 
Mayeri, Marital Supremacy and the Constitution of the Nonmarital Family, 103 CAL. L. 
REV. 1277 (2015) (discussing the development of constitutional protections for nonmarital 
children). 
 94. See, e.g., infra note 244. 
 95. See infra notes 97–103 and accompanying text. 
 96. See, e.g., West v. Brown, 558 F.2d 757, 760 (5th Cir. 1977) (rejecting the argument 
that a regulation prohibiting single parents from serving in the Army “affirmatively 
curtail[ed] marriage”); Zavala v. City & Cty. of Denver, 759 P.2d 664, 673 (Colo. 1988) (en 
banc) (rejecting the argument that the right “to create a marriage relationship” supports the 
existence of “the right not to marry”); Willard v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 592 P.2d 
1103, 1106 & n.1 (Wash. 1979) (en banc) (rejecting the suggestion that laws discriminating 
on the basis of marital status would violate a fundamental right not to marry). But see Doe v. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 487 N.W.2d 166, 185 (Mich. 1992) (Levin, J., concurring) (assuming 
the existence of “right to choose not to marry” in dictum).  In Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967), the Supreme Court stated in broad terms that “the freedom to marry, or not marry, a 
person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State,” but 
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A.  Rights to and Not to 
It is a common assumption in American constitutional law that the 
existence of rights to include the right not to, and vice versa.97  We might 
derive a right not to speak from the right to speak;98 a right to procreate 
from the right not to procreate;99 or the right not to associate with someone 
from the right to associate.100  This view has gained traction from language 
in judicial opinions that seems to suggest that rights are “bilateral” or “two-
way streets.”101  In Loving v. Virginia,102 for example, the Court stated that 
the “freedom of choice to marry” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment 
includes “the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race.”103 
Some scholars, however, have cautioned that symmetry alone does not 
justify the existence of rights.104  Indeed, many constitutional rights, like 
the Sixth Amendment rights to a speedy and public trial or the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s right against involuntary servitude, do not imply equal and 
opposite rights—for example, rights to a slow and private trial or the right 
to be a slave.105  In other words, we cannot simply assume into existence a 
right not to marry from the right to marry. 
In one of the most detailed analyses of the relationship between rights to 
and not to in U.S. rights discourse to date,106 Professor Joseph Blocher has 
argued that a right protects both a right to and not to—a “choice right” in 
his terminology—in two circumstances.  The first is when the right is 
“purely personal,” that is to say that “the purpose of the right is to protect 
the autonomy of the individual rightsholders.”107  Examples include the 
rights to speak, associate, and practice religion, all of which imply rights 
not to.108  The second is when the proposed right furthers its own 
constitutional value(s).109  That value might be the same for both the right 
to and not to—for example, both allowing speech and avoiding compelled 
 
the state statute at issue restricted rather than compelled marriage, providing no basis to test 
the existence or content of the right not to marry. Id. at 12. 
 97. See JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 6 (1996). 
 98. See, e.g., Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988) (noting that the 
term “freedom of speech” comprises “the decision of both what to say and what not to say”); 
W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634, 642 (1943) (upholding the right of 
public students not to salute the flag as part of the protection against compelled speech). 
 99. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, 
Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 416 (1983) (arguing that the “well-
established” right not to procreate “implies the freedom not to exercise it and, hence, the 
freedom to procreate”). 
 100. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (“Freedom of association 
therefore plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.”). 
 101. See GARVEY, supra note 97, at 5. 
 102. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 103. Id. at 12 (emphasis added). 
 104. Joseph Blocher, Rights to and Not to, 100 CAL. L. REV. 761, 764 (2012). 
 105. See id. at 784–86. 
 106. Blocher emphasizes that his account is more descriptive than philosophical:  the goal 
of his taxonomy of rights is to explain existing legal doctrine and apply the taxonomy to 
concrete legal disputes. See id. at 769–70. 
 107. Id. at 767. 
 108. Id. at 770. 
 109. Id. at 811. 
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speech serve the same constitutional value of promoting high-value 
speech.110  But the values might differ.  While the right to engage in sexual 
intercourse might primarily vindicate the value of autonomy, the right not 
to engage in sexual intercourse could additionally be justified by the 
separate interest of protecting a person’s bodily integrity.111 
Despite its deep importance to individuals, the right to marry is not 
“purely personal”; it is also “grounded in some broader social interest.”112  
Moreover, even if it were possible to conclude, based on Blocher’s 
framework, that the right to marry is a choice right, giving rise to a right not 
to marry, that conclusion would not answer the thornier question of how far 
that right extends.  Courts might readily accept that the right not to marry 
should prevent the state from rounding up all single people and pairing 
them off in a way that maximizes social utility, but what actions short of 
that extreme would implicate the right?  In the context of the right not to 
marry, to frame the inquiry in terms of whether the right to implies the right 
not to misses the critical inquiry.  The appropriate question is not whether 
the recognition of a right implies an equal and opposite right in the 
Newtonian sense.  Rather, it is whether that right encompasses the claims at 
issue. 
That question prompts a functional analysis of the proposed right.113  
Under this view, we might ask what values the established right—in our 
case the right to marry—promotes.114  Those values form a logical starting 
point to determine whether the law should recognize the proposed right, 
although we might identify additional instrumental values favoring the 
existence of such a right.115 
B.  Valuing the Right to Marry 
The right to marry has confounded courts and critics because it has 
always promoted both private and public values.116  Though the right to 
 
 110. See id. 
 111. Id. at 769. 
 112. Id. at 802. 
 113. Professor Kenneth Karst, for example, applied a functional analysis in arguing that 
the freedom of intimate association should protect both the choice to associate and the choice 
not to associate because “[a] chosen intimate association can serve, for example, as a 
statement of self-identification in a way that cannot be matched by an association imposed 
by force of law, and intimacy implies the choice not to associate oneself in intimate ways 
with the world at large.” Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE 
L.J. 624, 637 (1980).  Professor John Garvey made the point even more directly when he 
argued that “freedoms are not necessarily bilateral.  Whether they are or not depends on the 
principles they revolve around.” GARVEY, supra note 97, at 18. 
 114. There are many examples of this form of reasoning in the United States Reports.  For 
example, the Court in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943), recognized a right of public school students not to salute the flag based on “the 
individual’s right to speak his own mind.” Id. at 634.  The same “sphere of intellect and 
spirit” promoted by voluntary speech would be threatened by compulsion. Id. at 642.  The 
values underlying the affirmative right therefore protected the negative right. 
 115. See Blocher, supra note 104, at 768. 
 116. Through much of the Nation’s history, marriage was the exclusive site for sex and 
procreation, policed by criminal laws prohibiting extramarital sex and property laws 
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marry has a long pedigree—“one of the vital personal rights essential to the 
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”117—its substance remains 
uncertain.  For example, some scholars have convincingly argued that states 
are not constitutionally obligated to recognize marriages, only to offer equal 
access to the institution they have created.118  They contend that positive 
rights—unlike “negative rights that protect citizens from excessive 
intrusion by the state”—are not constitutionally compelled.119  That being 
so, states retain the power to alter the package of marital rights and 
obligations.120  Under this line of thinking, states could even abolish 
marriage entirely without running afoul of the Constitution.121 
Three dissenting Justices in Obergefell came close to endorsing this view 
that the Constitution does not require states to create a system of legal rights 
associated with marriage.122  Justice Thomas argued in his dissent that 
“liberty has long been understood as individual freedom from governmental 
action, not as a right to a particular governmental entitlement.”123  In a 
similar vein, Chief Justice Roberts questioned what a right to marriage 
would protect, given that same-sex marriage bans already allowed same-sex 
couples “to live together, to engage in intimate conduct, and to raise their 
families as they see fit.”124  Justice Thomas added that same-sex couples 
could “make vows to their partners in public ceremonies” and even “hold 
themselves out as married” without running afoul of state restrictions.125  
 
governing inheritance and making distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate children.  
Marriage granted legal entitlements and immunities but also involved state control. See 
JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE:  LAW AND THE 
FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 27–77, 238–39 (2011); Ariela R. Dubler, Sexing 
Skinner:  History and the Politics of the Right to Marry, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1348, 1353 
(2010); Melissa Murray, Marriage As Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 19–23 (2012). 
 117. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 118. See Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There’s No Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 27 
(1996); Martha C. Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?, 98 CAL. L. REV. 667 (2010); Scott, supra 
note 32, at 545 (“[L]awmakers probably could abolish marriage altogether.”); Sunstein, 
supra note 20, at 2084; Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to 
Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1378 (2010). 
 119. See Scott, supra note 32, at 545. 
 120. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Promulgating the Marriage Contract, 23 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 217, 253 (1990). 
 121. See supra note 118. But see Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to 
Marry:  Same-Sex Marriage in the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1184 
(2004); Gregg Strauss, Why the State Cannot “Abolish Marriage”:  A Partial Defense of 
Legal Marriage, 90 IND. L.J. 1261, 1263 (2015) (arguing that such proposals are politically 
infeasible and practically impossible). 
 122. It goes without saying that these justices did not endorse the equality rationale 
advanced by the scholars discussed supra note 118. 
 123. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2631 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 124. Id. at 2620 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  The first two parts of the assertion—that 
same-sex couples could live together and engage in intimate conduct—are most likely 
correct after Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  The third part—that couples could 
“raise their families as they see fit,” Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2620, is patently incorrect.  The 
challenged laws had the effect of interfering with the plaintiffs’ ability to jointly adopt 
children. See id. at 2595 (noting that Michigan only allowed opposite-sex married couples or 
single persons to adopt). 
 125. Id. at 2635 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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He contrasted the mere absence of legal protections for same-sex couples 
with the antimiscegenation law in Loving that prohibited, on pain of 
criminal prosecution, private actions associated with marriage.126  By 
implication, a law merely withholding legal benefits from interracial 
couples would not violate the right to marry, because the couples could live 
together, engage in sexual contact, and hold themselves out as married 
without fear of prosecution. 
The majority opinion did not explain its rejection of these arguments, but 
did offer two possible responses.  First, and at the very least, the fact that a 
majority of justices expanded the right to marry to protect the choice of 
individuals to marry people of the same sex endorses an equality principle:  
once created, the rights and responsibilities of marriage cannot be denied on 
an unequal basis.127  Although equality is the primary value protected by 
this approach, other values do not disappear.  Marriage still remains a 
fundamental interest that the state cannot arbitrarily deny because of the 
values it promotes.  But the rejection of the views expressed in Chief 
Justice Roberts’s and Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinions could also 
suggest that the majority viewed marriage as an inchoate good in and of 
itself—“a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the 
committed individuals”128 and a “keystone” institution “at the center of 
many facets of the legal and social order.”129 
Although the substance of the right to marry is far from certain, it is safe 
to say, at least for now, that the right to marry exists to promote certain 
values beyond equal access.130  Those values inhere in both the individual 
and the state.  The flurry of judicial opinions issued on the way to the 
Obergefell decision, and the Obergefell case itself, cast these values in a 
fresh light. 
1.  Autonomy and Identity 
Marriage has long been characterized as a voluntary association.131  And 
virtually every account of the right to marry in the past several decades has 
commented on the general turn toward the concepts of privacy, liberty, and 
 
 126. Id. at 2637 (noting that the Lovings were sentenced to a year of imprisonment for 
holding themselves out as married). 
 127. See Sunstein, supra note 20, at 2096; Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 118, at 1380 
(“[O]ur equal access approach holds that, once conferred, the right to marry in a legally 
recognized ceremony is fundamental:  if a government decides to recognize and support civil 
marriage, it cannot exclude same-sex couples without providing an adequate justification.”). 
 128. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2589. 
 129. Id. at 2590. 
 130. See Leib, supra note 20, at 41–42 (noting the existence of an “open” question over 
“whether Justice Kennedy actually created not just a right to marry, but also a right to 
marriage itself”). 
 131. See NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS:  A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 9–17 
(2000); Janet Halley, Behind the Law of Marriage (I):  From Status/Contract to the 
Marriage System, 6 UNBOUND:  HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 1, 17 (2010). 
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autonomy.132  Those concepts have led to the recent emergence of an 
identity-centric understanding of autonomy. 
In striking down Virginia’s antimiscegenation law in Loving, the Court 
characterized the “freedom to marry” as a “vital personal right” and noted 
that the choice of one’s spouse—regardless of race—“resides with the 
individual.”133  The personal nature of the right to marry gained further 
clarification from the connection between marriage and procreative 
freedom.  Cases protecting decisions related to contraception134 and 
abortion135 emphasized the significant impact on one’s identity of having 
children.  The Court in Roe v. Wade,136 for example, observed that 
unwanted “[m]aternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman 
a distressful life and future,” potentially causing “[p]sychological harm” 
and “stigma.”137  These statements reveal a sensitivity to how a person 
views herself—focusing on psychological harm and distress—and how the 
person is viewed by others—as a person with a disfavored identity.138 
This reasoning entered marriage cases like Turner v. Safley,139 in which 
the Court struck down a requirement that prisoners obtain permission from 
the superintendent to marry.140  Because of their incarceration, prisoners 
lacked the ability to cohabit with their spouses or consummate their 
relationship.  Nonetheless, the Court held that they retained their right to 
marry because many of the “important attributes” of marriage remained, 
even despite those limitations:  “Inmate marriages, like others, are 
expressions of emotional support and public commitment,” as well as an 
“expression of personal dedication.”141 
Unsurprisingly, marriage equality advocates tapped into these 
understandings.  During the widely publicized trial regarding the validity of 
Proposition 8, California’s same-sex marriage ban, plaintiff Paul Katami 
was asked what would change if he were allowed to marry his partner, Jeff 
Zarrillo.142  Katami responded, 
Being able to call him my husband is so definitive, it changes our 
relationship. . . .  It is absolute, and also comes with a modicum of respect 
 
 132. See, e.g., Steve Sanders, The Constitutional Right to (Keep Your) Same-Sex 
Marriage, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1421, 1428–29 (2012). 
 133. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 134. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965). 
 135. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973). 
 136. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 137. Id. at 153. 
 138. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 753 (1989) 
(contending that the right to self-definition—what Rubenfeld calls the “personhood thesis”—
has come to dominate the Fourteenth Amendment’s right of privacy). 
 139. 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
 140. See id. at 99–100. 
 141. Id. at 95–96.  Cass Sunstein has called “the expressive legitimacy that comes from 
the public institution of marriage” one of two characteristics of marriage that the right to 
marry protects. Sunstein, supra note 20, at 2083. 
 142. Transcript of Trial at 88, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 
2010) (No. 09-2292-VRW). 
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and understanding that your relationship is not temporal . . . .  It’s 
something you’ve dedicated yourself to and you’re committed to.143 
When asked how it felt not to be able to choose to marry, he described 
“the struggle that we have validating ourselves to other people” and 
continued, “Unless you have to go through a constant validation of self, 
there’s no way to really describe how it feels.”144 
Katami’s testimony articulates a particular theory about the relationship 
between the choice to marry and development of one’s sense of self.  The 
decision to marry is a means of self-identification.  As Katami notes, it 
changes one’s own “understanding” of one’s relationship and impacts the 
way one “feels.”145  But it also makes a public statement and asks for public 
respect and validation, which likewise affects one’s sense of self.146 
These arguments reached their zenith in the Court’s latest discussion of 
the right to marry in Obergefell.  Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion starts 
from the lofty premise that the “liberty” protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment extends to “personal choices central to individual dignity and 
autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and 
beliefs.”147 
Several principles explain why the right to marry falls within this concept 
of liberty.148  First, the choices “whether and whom to marry” are “among 
life’s momentous acts of self-definition.”149  Thus, because these decisions 
are “inherent in the concept of individual autonomy”—and, indeed, they 
“shape an individual’s destiny”—they are constitutionally protected.150  
The principle comes into sharper focus when read in light of Chief Justice 
Roberts’s dissent.  The Chief Justice argued that same-sex marriage bans 
left same-sex couples “free to live together, to engage in intimate conduct, 
and to raise their families as they see fit.”151  If same-sex couples could 
choose to live together or to engage in intimate conduct without fear of 
government interference, how was their autonomy being interfered with?  
In other words, what measure of autonomy would they gain by accessing 
marriage?152 
 
 143. Id. at 89. 
 144. Id. at 90–91. 
 145. Cf. Karst, supra note 113, at 635 (arguing that all intimate associations play a role 
“with the formation and shaping of an individual’s sense of his own identity”). 
 146. The other plaintiffs in Perry offered similar testimony:  “Stier explained that 
marrying [her same-sex partner, Perry,] would make them feel included ‘in the social fabric.’  
Marriage would be a way to tell ‘our friends, our family, our society, our community, our 
parents . . . and each other that this is a lifetime commitment.’” Perry, 704 F. Supp. at 933 
(citations omitted). 
 147. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015). 
 148. Id. at 2598 (distilling the “essential attributes of [the right to marry] based in history, 
tradition, and other constitutional liberties”). 
 149. Id. at 2599 (quoting Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955 (Mass. 
2003)). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 2620 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 152. This is also the thrust of Justice Thomas’s dissent, in which he argues that “liberty 
has long been understood as individual freedom from governmental action, not as a right to a 
particular governmental entitlement.” Id. at 2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  According to 
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A second principle answers those questions.  The majority opinion 
states—somewhat tautologically—that “the right to marry is fundamental 
because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to 
the committed individuals.”153  In other words, marriage is fundamental 
because people believe it is more fundamental than other two-person 
relationships.  The consequence of this belief is that other forms of 
relationships, even if legally equivalent to marriage, cannot confer the full 
measure of dignity and liberty that marriage can provide:  “Outlaw to 
outcast may be a step forward, but it does not achieve the full promise of 
liberty.”154  Because of these qualitative differences, the choice to marry 
affects the person making the choice differently from the choice to enter 
other types of intimate relationships. 
Together, these two principles elaborate on the autonomy rationales that 
emerged in earlier marriage cases and in Katami’s testimony.  The choice to 
marry is an important act of self-definition in that it expresses individual 
preferences and taps into an institution with greater social meaning.  By 
recognizing the contribution of social validation to the right of marriage, the 
majority opinion endorses the view that identity is not formed in a vacuum 
but depends also on external conditions.155  The majority opinion also 
amplifies the suggestion from Turner v. Safley that the right to marry 
extends beyond the scope of the individual.156  Through marriage, “two 
persons together can find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and 
spirituality.”157  If the union of marriage is itself “profound,” and through it 
“two people become something greater than they once were,”158 then the 
value of autonomy protects individual choice as well as broader social 
connections.  In its latest incarnation, the right to marry embraces the self-
 
Justice Thomas, same-sex couples could “make vows to their partners in public ceremonies” 
and even “hold themselves out as married” without running afoul of state restrictions. Id. at 
2635. 
 153. Id. at 2589. 
 154. Id. at 2600.  This argument had not escaped the attention of legal scholars. See, e.g., 
Suzanne A. Kim, Marital Naming/Naming Marriage:  Language and Status in Family Law, 
85 IND. L.J. 893, 902 (2010); NeJaime, supra note 92, at 230; Marc R. Poirier, Name 
Calling:  Identifying Stigma in the “Civil Union”/“Marriage” Distinction, 41 CONN. L. REV. 
1425, 1429 (2009).  Other scholars, however, have argued that the relationship between 
autonomy and dignity is a complicated one, especially given the slippery meanings of both 
concepts and that the concepts can sometimes be at odds. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Three 
Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2092 (2001) (“Unlike autonomy, dignity depends 
upon intersubjective norms that define the forms of conduct that constitute respect between 
persons.”); Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 183, 187–88 (2011) (noting that dignity can refer to freedom for the individual to 
exercise his autonomy, or to the belief in particular conceptions of human flourishing that 
may express community, rather than individual, values). 
 155. This principle, I believe, is an implicit rebuttal of Justice Thomas’s argument, in 
dissent, that “[s]laves did not lose their dignity (any more than they lost their humanity) 
because the government allowed them to be enslaved. . . .  The government cannot bestow 
dignity, and it cannot take it away.” Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2639 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 156. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 157. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (emphasis added). 
 158. Id. at 2594, 2608. 
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defining choice to marry in its individual, interpersonal, and societal 
dimensions.159 
2.  Stability, Identity, and Identification 
When the substance of the right to marry is thought of at all, it is usually 
thought of in terms of entry or access.160  Most cases, after all, have 
challenged laws preventing people from marrying in the first instance, 
whether because of race,161 sexual orientation,162 finances,163 or 
imprisonment.164  But the right to marry surely must encompass more than 
the choice to enter the relationship.  After all, distinctions based on marital 
status are relevant during the life of the marriage and continue on through 
divorce.165  Until recently, we knew very little about these other dimensions 
of the right to marry, but they have begun to come into sharper focus. 
Although it is primarily a case about access to marriage, the Obergefell 
case gestures to an additional aspect to the right to marry:  “permanency 
and stability.”166  Several times in the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy 
called attention to the innate (in his view, at least)167 need for intimate 
companionship:  “Marriage responds to the universal fear that a lonely 
person might call out only to find no one there.  It offers the hope of 
companionship and understanding and assurance that while both still live 
 
 159. It is worth noting that four dissenting justices did not endorse the majority’s 
conclusions regarding the relationship between marriage and autonomy.  But it is not clear to 
what extent those justices would sever autonomy from the right to marry.  Although Chief 
Justice Roberts suggested that only laws that “interfere with the ‘right to be let alone’” 
implicate a right to autonomy, see id. at 2620 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting), he did not disavow 
the reasoning of the Court’s earlier marriage precedents. See id.  Only Justices Thomas and 
Scalia appear to believe that autonomy and marriage are conceptual strangers.  To those 
justices, marriage is fundamentally about government entitlements—not “any understanding 
of ‘liberty’ that the Framers would have recognized.’” See id. at 2636 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“To the extent that the Framers would have recognized a natural right to 
marriage that fell within the broader definition of liberty, it would not have included a right 
to government recognition and benefits.  Instead, it would have included a right to engage in 
the very same activities that petitioners have been left free to engage in.”). 
 160. See Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1, 64 (2012) (“When courts 
refer to a ‘right to marry,’ they refer not to particular benefits currently included in marriage 
but instead to the right of access to whatever privileged status the state is currently 
offering.”). But see Sanders, supra note 132, at 1424 (arguing that same-sex couples who 
marry in a state in which it is legal and move to one in which it is not—no longer a problem 
after Obergefell—have “a significant liberty interest . . . in the ongoing existence of [their] 
marriage”). 
 161. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 162. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584. 
 163. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
 164. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
 165. Cf. Strauss, supra note 121, at 1266–73 (noting the ways in which the law regulates 
these phases of the marital relationship). 
 166. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600. 
 167. But cf. Noah Feldman, Marriage Is a Right, Not an Obligation, BLOOMBERG VIEW 
(June 28, 2015), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-06-28/marriage-is-a-right-
not-an-obligation (arguing that Justice Kennedy’s discussion of loneliness “went too far” and 
“has the effect of devaluing the fullness of lives conducted outside the bounds of marriage”) 
[https://perma.cc/53DL-XP67]. 
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there will be someone to care for the other . . . .”168  “[M]arriage embodies a 
love that may endure even past death.”169  But, as Chief Justice Roberts 
observed, “No one is ‘condemned to live in loneliness’ by the laws 
challenged in these cases—no one.”170  On this point, the Chief Justice 
appears to have the upper hand:  the named plaintiffs, after all, were living 
together, albeit in a state of nonrecognition, and not even marriage could 
bring back James Obergefell’s deceased spouse.171  Moreover, in a world 
where a substantial percentage of marriages end in divorce,172 marriage is 
not a particularly effective panacea for loneliness. 
This seemingly tangential dispute reveals that marriage is something 
more than contemporaneous companionship.  It involves the expectation (or 
“hope”) of permanency.173  That expectation in turn promotes stability.174  
These values are part of the right to marry, as the following examples will 
illustrate. 
United States v. Windsor175 generated intense debate about what the 
decision portended for the constitutional right to marriage equality at the 
state level.176  But the case was fundamentally about whether the federal 
government could refuse to recognize same-sex marriages that were valid 
under state law, thereby giving different legal effect to opposite- and same-
sex marriages that a state deemed identical.177  In answering that question, 
the Court looked closely at the effect of nonrecognition on otherwise valid 
same-sex marriages.  “By creating two contradictory marriage regimes 
within the same State,” the Court reasoned, the federal Defense Against 
Marriage Act (DOMA) “forces same-sex couples to live as married for the 
purpose of state law but unmarried for the purpose of federal law, thus 
diminishing the stability and predictability of basic personal relations the 
State has found it proper to acknowledge and protect.”178  There was 
nothing particularly unpredictable about the discrimination at issue, which 
allowed the couples all of the benefits of marriage at the state level but none 
at the federal level.  Instead, the instability came from the “position of being 
in a second-tier marriage.”179  The differential treatment would undermine 
the stability of the relationship by expressing to “those couples, and all the 
 
 168. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600. 
 169. Id. at 2608. 
 170. Id. at 2620 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 171. See id. at 2594–95 (majority opinion). 
 172. See Claire Cain Miller, The Divorce Surge Is Over, but the Myth Lives on, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/upshot/the-divorce-surge-is-
over-but-the-myth-lives-on.html (noting that over 45 percent of marriages from the 1970s 
and 1980s ended in divorce, but that approximately 35 percent of marriages from the 1990s 
ended in divorce) [http://perma.cc/KXA5-3EEV]. 
 173. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600. 
 174. Justice Kennedy did not cite any empirical support for this reasoning, but the 
literature suggests that marriages, while by no means permanent, are more stable than 
cohabiting relationships. See Scott, supra note 32, at 547–48. 
 175. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 176. See, e.g., NeJaime, supra note 92. 
 177. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692. 
 178. Id. at 2694 (emphasis added). 
 179. Id. 
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world,” that their relationships are in some way less valuable than other 
marriages.180 
Relatedly, courts have also considered whether states must recognize 
marriages entered into during periods of legal transition.  These cases 
illustrate both a right to maintain one’s marriage and a recognition of both 
individual and state interests in protecting an ongoing right to marry. 
On Friday, March 21, 2014, the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Michigan struck down Michigan’s Marriage Amendment 
prohibiting same-sex marriage, and enjoined the State of Michigan from 
enforcing it.181  Notwithstanding the state’s pending stay request, on that 
Saturday morning, four local county clerks opened their offices, waived the 
three-day waiting period, and immediately began to issue marriage 
licenses.182  That afternoon, however, the Sixth Circuit issued a temporary 
stay, which was later converted to a full stay pending appeal.183  With that, 
the window for obtaining marriage licenses abruptly closed, but not before 
clerks had issued marriage licenses to approximately 300 same-sex couples 
in a few hours.184  Following the issuance of the full stay on March 26, 
Michigan Governor Richard Snyder announced that the state would not 
recognize the Saturday marriages.185 
In Caspar v. Snyder,186 same-sex couples who had married that Saturday, 
March 22, sued the state demanding recognition of their marriages as valid 
under state law.187  The district court noted that the lawsuit presented a 
unique legal issue—whether couples lawfully married (during a legal 
window lasting mere hours in this case) could be deprived of their marital 
status due to a subsequent change in the law (bringing the law back to its 
original state).188 
In ordering the state to recognize the plaintiffs’ marriages, the court 
reasoned that the decision not to recognize the Saturday marriages as valid 
“could catastrophically undermine the stability that marriage seeks to 
create.”189  It would disturb their estate plans, pensions, and other financial 
arrangements.190  “In terms of the personal ordering and orderliness of 
 
 180. See id. 
 181. See DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 775 (E.D. Mich. 2014), rev’d sub nom. 
772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1040 (2015). 
 182. Caspar v. Snyder, 77 F. Supp. 3d 616, 621 (E.D. Mich. 2015). 
 183. See id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 621–22 (quoting the Governor’s statements at a March 26 press conference). 
 186. 77 F. Supp. 3d 616 (E.D. Mich. 2015). 
 187. Id. at 620.  Plaintiffs alleged that the refusal to recognize their marriages as valid 
caused intangible harms such as “loss of dignity,” “feelings of ‘uncertainty and anxiety,’” 
“loss of peace of mind,” and “‘hurt’ and ‘disheartenment,’” as well as tangible harms like the 
denial of health insurance benefits and the inability to adopt their partner’s child. Id. at 622. 
 188. See id. at 623 (stating the issue as “whether same-sex couples who were married 
pursuant to Michigan marriage licenses issued under Michigan law—as it stood at the time 
their marriages were solemnized—may, consistent with the Constitution, be stripped by the 
state of their marital status”); see also id. at 629. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See id. 
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one’s most fundamental affairs, nothing would be more destructive of 
‘ordered liberty.’”191 
Other courts considering whether to recognize marriages in analogous 
circumstances have come to similar conclusions.  In Evans v. Utah,192 
same-sex couples who had married in the period between a district court 
decision striking down Utah’s same-sex marriage ban and a stay imposed 
by the U.S. Supreme Court sought a preliminary injunction compelling the 
state to recognize their marriages.193  Similarly holding that the couples’ 
marriages were legal, and that the subsequent nonrecognition of those 
marriages would unlawfully deprive the couples of the constitutionally 
protected rights and responsibilities of marriage,194 the court emphasized 
that 
[t]he State has placed Plaintiffs and their families in a state of legal limbo 
with respect to adoptions, child care and custody, medical decisions, 
employment and health benefits, future tax implications, inheritance, and 
many other property and fundamental rights associated with marriage.  
These legal uncertainties and lost rights cause harm each day that the 
marriage is not recognized.195 
What would be so unfair, though, about not recognizing marriages 
entered into under such uncertain circumstances?  Put another way, why 
should the couples not share some responsibility for the legal uncertainty 
they faced?  The district court opinions authorizing these marriages were on 
the books for only hours or days before they were stayed.  It would seem 
impossible for this short duration to give rise to the settled expectations to 
which they referred.196 
 
 191. Id.  Much of the court’s analysis depends on the government’s concession that the 
marriages that occurred were legal. See id. at 623. 
 192. 21 F. Supp. 3d 1192 (D. Utah 2014). 
 193. Id. 
 194. See id. at 1209–10. 
 195. Id. at 1210. 
 196. Cf. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., Inc., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994); United States v. 
Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 37–38 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing the value of 
“settled expectations” and “finality and repose” (citation omitted)).  Courts have identified 
several factors relevant in assessing whether one’s expectations are settled, including “the 
extent of reliance upon the former law, the legitimacy of that reliance, [and] the extent of 
actions taken on the basis of that reliance.” Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 121 (Cal. 2009) 
(discussing whether to invalidate 18,000 same-sex marriages occurring between the state 
supreme court’s decision legalizing same-sex marriage and a voter-initiated constitutional 
amendment defining marriage as between a man and a woman).  These factors appear to 
point away from settled expectations rather than toward it.  Practically speaking, how many 
changes to estate plans, pensions, and benefits could the couples have possibly made before 
the district court decisions were stayed?  In other legal contexts, scholars have argued that 
the law should promote responsible decision making by encouraging parties to anticipate the 
possibility of legal change or forcing them to internalize the costs of poor decisions. See, 
e.g., Michael J. Graetz, Retroactivity Revisted, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1823–24 (1985); 
Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 524–28 
(1986).  Reliance interests are weaker when the law is in a state of flux. See Fisch, supra 
note 85, at 1109.  One cannot imagine that courts would encourage businesses or taxpayers 
to make impactful long-term decisions in a similar legal landscape. See United States v. 
Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 33 (1994) (suggesting that a plaintiff’s reliance on a previous version 
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The impossibility of significant economic and legal reliance in these 
circumstances reveals that these decisions clearly protect more than 
economic decision making.  To wit, the Caspar court noted that “[s]ame-
sex couples, like their opposite-sex-couple counterparts, have the same 
innately human impulse to maintain bonds of committed intimacy in a 
socially and legally recognized marriage.”197  Refusing to recognize 
otherwise lawful marriages strikes at the heart of self-identification by 
rejecting the couple’s description of their relationship.198  In that sense, 
remaining married—like choosing to marry—promotes individual 
autonomy. 
But it is worth noting that certainty serves not only the interests of 
individuals, but also of the state.  In other words, certainty is of special 
importance with respect to marriage because of marriage’s role in 
identifying individuals as legal subjects.  In Strauss v. Horton,199 the 
California Supreme Court considered whether Proposition 8, a 
constitutional amendment effectively overruling a state court decision 
legalizing same-sex marriage, invalidated thousands of marriages that had 
taken place before the amendment passed.200  Answering in the negative, 
the court reasoned that invalidating five months worth of marriages would 
“disrupt thousands of actions taken in reliance on the Marriage Cases by 
these same-sex couples, their employers, their creditors, and many 
others . . . potentially undermining the ability of citizens to plan their 
lives.”201 
The choice to marry is not an isolated decision affecting just the parties, 
but rather fundamentally changes the way a person interacts with society as 
both a social and legal subject.202  Because so many legal rights and 
obligations are bundled into the status of marriage,203 the disruptive effect 
of uncertainty is magnified and can burden those around the marital couple:  
creditors, employers, children, and even the state.  And this consideration 
for the interests of third parties reveals that marital choice goes beyond 
 
of the tax code would have to be legitimate); see also id. at 35–36 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(analyzing the legitimacy of reliance in more depth). 
 197. Caspar, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 642 (emphasis added). 
 198. The Caspar court analogized the situation to another involving self-authorship:  
cases in which surviving same-sex-spouses had requested (and district courts commanded) 
that the state issue death certificates identifying decedents as “married” to them over the 
states’ refusal. Id. at 640 (citing Majors v. Jeanes, 48 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1317 (D. Ariz. 
2014); Baskin v. Bogan, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1028 (S.D. Ind. 2014)). 
 199. 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 122. 
 202. See Evans v. Utah, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1192, 1210 (D. Utah 2014) (identifying the “state 
of legal limbo with respect to adoptions, child care and custody, medical decisions, 
employment and health benefits, future tax implications, inheritance, and many other 
property and fundamental rights associated with marriage” as the irreparable harm justifying 
injunctive relief). 
 203. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955 (Mass. 2003) (“The 
benefits accessible only by way of a marriage license are enormous, touching nearly every 
aspect of life and death.”). 
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protecting identity; it also performs identification.204  That is to say that a 
function of the right to marry is not only to protect settled expectations, but 
actually to settle the expectations of the couple and others on an ongoing 
basis. 
3.  Dignity 
That marriage is a tool to identify and categorize legal subjects serves as 
a reminder that marriage exists to vindicate not only individual autonomy 
interests, but the state’s interests as well.  Indeed, the Obergefell majority 
ruled in favor of same-sex couples because their relationships could 
embody the preexisting and “essential attributes” of marriage205—“a two-
person union” involving “intima[cy],” “harmony,” “loyalty,” 
“commitment,” and lifelong “companionship.”206 
This Court-endorsed normative view of marriage serves the state in 
several respects.  It renders the family unit the primary source of financial 
support and caregiving for dependents and children.207  Marriage is also a 
site of discipline and regulation, articulating sexual and moral norms208 and 
reinforcing appropriate spousal behavior.209  Couples seeking the law’s 
assistance in altering spousal duties have discovered that their authority in 
that regard is significantly constrained.210 
Obergefell reminds us that marriage is a public good.211  Professor Nan 
Hunter has observed that “the dignity rights at issue [in Obergefell] flow 
 
 204. Cf. id. at 969 (describing marriage as a “vital organizing principle of our society”). 
 205. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598, 2599 (2015).  Professor Clare 
Huntington has characterized the competing images of marriage as “social fronts,” and she 
argues that the choice between social fronts unnecessarily “reifies marriage as a key element 
in the social front of family.” Clare Huntington, Obergefell’s Conservatism:  Reifying 
Familial Fronts, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 23 (2015). 
 206. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599–600 (citations omitted). 
 207. See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 92, at 226 (“In our individualistic society, the state 
relies on the family—allocating to it the care and protection of society’s weaker members.”); 
Laura A. Rosenbury, Federal Visions of Private Family Support, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1835, 
1866 (2014).  Some scholars have gone so far as to argue that this is the family’s primary 
function. See id. (arguing that “the ultimate value underlying legal recognition of family” is 
“private family support”). 
 208. See Murray, supra note 116, at 40.  Another way that the law of marriage articulates 
norms is through fault-based grounds for divorce, which include adultery, desertion, mental 
or physical cruelty, drunkenness, and nonsupport. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 116, 
at 161–68.  In the states that recognize these fault-based grounds, spouses who behave in 
these disapproved of ways can face negative consequences. See id. 
 209. For example, Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, 
noted that “by bestowing a respected status and material benefits on married couples, society 
encourages men and women to conduct sexual relations within marriage rather than 
without.” Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2613 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see 
also Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 992 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“The state 
regulates marriage because marriage creates stable households, which in turn form the basis 
of a stable, governable populace.”); Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Public Policing of Intimate 
Agreements, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 159, 162–63 (2013). 
 210. See Matsumura, supra note 209, at 178–95. 
 211. See, e.g., Leib, supra note 20, at 41; Serena Mayeri, Marriage (In)equality and the 
Historical Legacies of Feminism, 6 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 126, 126 (2015). 
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less from the bedrock of human rights than from the respectability of both 
the particular institution and the particular plaintiffs whose moral worth 
render them eligible to participate in it.”212  The choice to engage in 
intimate sexual conduct, for example, promises a certain measure of 
freedom, but “does not achieve the full promise of liberty” that marriage 
can provide:  people who cannot marry are still society’s “outcast[s].”213  
Although autonomy remains important under this account, the Court 
appears equally concerned about the denial of access to a “transcendent” 
institution that “embodies the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, 
sacrifice, and family.”214  The dignity referred to in Obergefell depends on 
shared social norms regarding both what types of relationships are valued 
and what types of conduct society owes to those who aspire to those 
values.215 
That the right to marry acts in service of the common good, however, 
does not negate the individual interests also served by the right.  As 
Professor Robert Post has observed, “[R]eal persons in the real world 
possess selves that are both independent and socially dependent.”216  Citing 
the work of sociologist George Herbert Mead, Post has noted that the self is 
both socialized and self-expressive:  “Taken together, they constitute a 
personality as it appears in social experience.”217  The concepts of 
autonomy and dignity, like the individual and the collective, can point in 
opposite directions.  The recognition of one, however, does not imply the 
exclusion of the other. 
In fact, the social meaning of marriage itself—the good to which 
Obergefell refers—integrates the concept of voluntariness and individual 
choice.  The social meaning of marriage is inseparable from individual 
interests.  The Court tells us that “by the time of the Nation’s founding 
[marriage] was understood to be a voluntary contract.”218  Marriage is a 
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment precisely because it 
involves an “intimate choice[] that define[s] personal identity and 
beliefs.”219 
Even privatized dependency is not an unalloyed benefit to the state.  In 
Windsor, the Court noted that the Defense of Marriage Act not only 
deprived same-sex couples of key federal benefits, but also some key 
 
 212. See Hunter, supra note 19, at 109; see also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (noting 
that “[t]he right to marry . . . dignifies couples who ‘wish to define themselves’” by choosing 
to marry). 
 213. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (emphasis added). 
 214. Id. at 2602, 2608. 
 215. Cf. Post, supra note 154, at 2092 (“Autonomy refers to the ability of persons to 
create their own identity and in this way to define themselves . . . .  Unlike autonomy, 
dignity depends upon intersubjective norms that define the forms of conduct that constitute 
respect between persons.”). 
 216. Id. at 2095. 
 217. Id. (citing GEORGE HERBERT MEAD, ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 239 (Anselm Strauss 
ed., 1964)). 
 218. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2595 (emphasis added). 
 219. Id. at 2597. 
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responsibilities.220  For instance, because federal law would ignore a same-
sex spouse’s income for the purposes of calculating federal financial aid 
eligibility, a married same-sex spouse might be eligible for more financial 
aid than a heterosexual spouse.221  Instead of seeing this as a windfall, 
however, the Court saw it as a harm in that it would deprive the same-sex 
spouses of a responsibility that is “an essential part of married 
life . . . support[ing] each other as they pursue educational 
opportunities.”222  To the Court, “Responsibilities, as well as rights, 
enhance the dignity and integrity of the person.”223 
The Court’s emphasis on the importance of responsibilities suggests that 
a relationship without legally enforceable rights and obligations might be 
qualitatively different than one that is completely voluntary and therefore 
less consequential.  Of course, this view advances the interests of the state 
in encouraging private individuals to support each other.  But the act of 
taking responsibility for another also reinforces and supports a person’s 
self-concept to the extent that those actions are integral to the person’s 
understanding of his or her relationship and the significance of the 
relationship to that person’s identity more broadly.224 
C.  Valuing the Right Not to Marry 
Many of the values promoted by the right to marry also support the 
recognition of a right not to marry.  The Court has stated that the decision 
“whether and whom to marry” is an important, self-defining choice.225  It 
follows from Loving and Obergefell that the choice of a particular partner, 
regardless of race or gender, is central to one’s identity.226  But if, as 
Justices Roberts and Thomas have pointed out, people could already engage 
in intimate behavior or cohabit with their chosen partners without fear of 
legal consequences before Obergefell,227 then the decision to identify the 
relationship with the institution of marriage makes a particularly significant 
statement.  It is precisely because of marriage’s “transcendent,” “highest 
meaning”228 that the decision whether to marry at all says so much about 
the self. 
One might therefore argue that given the state’s veneration of marriage, 
the right to marry would not necessarily compel the same level of respect 
for, or recognition of, choices to enter other (arguably inferior) relationships 
or not to marry at all.  For example, it is not self-evident that the choice to 
enter a domestic partnership would involve the same autonomy interests as 
 
 220. See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013). 
 221. Id. at 2695. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 2694. 
 224. See Peter J. Burke & Donald C. Reitzes, The Link Between Identity and Role 
Performance, 44 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 83, 84 (1981) (“[T]he self operates in choosing 
behaviors and . . . the behaviors reinforce and support the self.”). 
 225. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015). 
 226. See id. at 2607; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 227. See supra notes 122–26 and accompanying text. 
 228. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. 
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the choice to marry, because of the different social meanings associated 
with those statuses.229  If one were to argue that the right not to marry 
imposed obligations on the state to create domestic partnerships, the right to 
marry might fail to offer support. 
If the right not to marry is thought of as freedom from state-imposed 
marriage, however, the autonomy interests become symmetrical with the 
interests protected by the right to marry.  Choosing to marry only takes on 
meaning because of the freedom to choose not to marry.  Although the state 
may prefer one choice over the other, the choice in either direction has the 
same valence from the perspective of self-definition and autonomy.230 
A right not to marry is justified by an additional, related value.  In its 
purest form, the right would entail freedom from state interference in 
“matters of family life” that are protected by the Due Process Clause.231  In 
safeguarding a range of related “intimate and personal” choices, the Court 
has noted that “[b]eliefs about these matters could not define the attributes 
of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.”  This 
concept of noninterference characterizes the privacy rights recognized 
under the Due Process Clause.232  While the Obergefell majority’s theory of 
autonomy and identity envisions the right to marry moving in the direction 
of a positive right,233 a negative right not to marry would still rest on more 
solid conceptual ground. 
A right not to marry also promotes “the stability and predictability of 
basic personal relations the State has found it proper to acknowledge and 
protect,”234 at least to some degree.  The Windsor, Caspar, and Evans cases 
discussed in Part II.B.2 above demonstrate that the right to marry or not to 
marry contributes to one’s identity on an ongoing basis:  a person’s identity 
depends not only on choosing to marry, but continuing in that status.235  
That identity might be “married,” or “not married,” as the case may be.  To 
the extent that the right to marry promotes stability in one’s identity as 
married, and that ongoing identity is meaningful to the married person, a 
right not to marry would serve the same ends. 
 
 229. This is not to say that there would not be good reasons to recognize other forms of 
intimate relationships. See, e.g., ELIZABETH BRAKE, MINIMIZING MARRIAGE:  MARRIAGE, 
MORALITY, AND THE LAW 156–88 (2012) (providing philosophical justifications for the legal 
recognition of a variety of relationships). 
 230. Note that my argument does not depend on the normative value of the choice but 
merely on the impact that the choice will have on a person’s identity.  The argument that the 
law may value the choice to marry differently than the choice not to marry does not change 
the impact of the choice on a person’s identity and therefore the importance of that choice 
from a constitutional perspective according to Obergefell. 
 231. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978); see also id. (noting the importance of 
“the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society”). 
 232. See Sunstein, supra note 20, at 2094 (“For the ordinary privacy rights with which 
marriage is associated, the Constitution requires governmental noninterference; it does not 
require the government to provide money, institutional arrangements, or anything else.”). 
 233. See supra notes 127–30 and accompanying text. 
 234. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (emphasis added). 
 235. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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Those cases, however, also referred to stability in another sense:  that the 
status of marriage confers security in one’s relationship that enables people 
to plan for the future and make investments in their families and their 
children.236  Whether or not this distinction rests on a solid empirical 
foundation,237 it is the social meaning of marriage that the courts have 
adopted:  marriage provides greater security over other family forms.238  
For instance, in discussing the right to marry, courts have not bothered to 
acknowledge the possibility of divorce.239  Moreover, even if marriage does 
not create actual stability, it may create at least the expectation of it.  While 
a right not to marry serves to secure the stability of one’s identity as 
married or unmarried, it cannot lay claim to the separate interest in 
promoting the stability of a socially desirable relationship. 
This is not to say that couples in alternate statuses like domestic 
partnerships and civil unions lack a protectable interest in the continuation 
of their statuses.  Those statuses also bring order to “one’s most 
fundamental affairs,”240 including “adoptions, child care and custody, 
medical decisions, employment and health benefits, future tax implications, 
[and] inheritance.”241  Couples in domestic partnerships and civil unions 
may have relied on the particular set of rights and obligations offered by 
those statuses.  Cohabitants might have defined their relationship around the 
absence of legal rights and obligations.242  These arguments, however, rest 
in legal doctrine that protects individuals from unfair changes in the law.  
The Court has observed that “[e]lementary considerations of fairness dictate 
that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to 
conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be 
lightly disrupted.”243  Following this principle, legislation that imposes 
legal consequences on past conduct must “meet a burden not faced by 
legislation that has only future effects.”244  This burden is not a particularly 
 
 236. See supra notes 189–90 and accompanying text. 
 237. There are studies that suggest that marriages are more stable than cohabiting 
relationships. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, From Contract to Status:  
Collaboration and the Evolution of Novel Family Relationships, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 293, 
311–12 (2015) (citing survey data and scientific studies).  One must keep in mind, though, 
that this difference does not rest on any inherent inferiority of nonmarital relationships.  
Cohabiting relationships could be statistically less stable both because of the characteristics 
of people who choose to cohabit rather than marry and because the law fails to support those 
relationships. See id. at 361–62. 
 238. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 992 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 
(finding, as a factual matter, that “[t]he state regulates marriage because marriage creates 
stable households”). 
 239. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015) (noting that marriage 
offers the hope that “while both still live there will be someone to care for the other”). 
 240. Caspar v. Snyder, 77 F. Supp. 3d 616, 629 (E.D. Mich. 2015). 
 241. Evans v. Utah, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1192, 1210 (D. Utah 2014). 
 242. See Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary?  An Evaluation of the Emerging Law of 
Cohabitant Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 815, 846 (2005) (noting that cohabiting and 
married couples view their relationships differently, with cohabitants usually functioning “as 
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 243. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., Inc., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994). 
 244. United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 31 (1994) (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. 
Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730 (1984)). 
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high one, but retroactive legislation must still be reasonable rather than 
“harsh and oppressive.”245 
Although these due process values are distinct from a right not to marry, 
they can also intersect.  A law terminating existing domestic partnerships or 
imposing different legal rights and obligations would not directly implicate 
a right not to marry—it would not impose legal marriage on anyone. 
Instead, it would raise due process concerns.246  But the state frequently 
allays these due process concerns by offering the palliative of marriage.  It 
is that coupling—termination with marriage—that brings the right not to 
marry into the picture. 
III.  SITUATING THE RIGHT NOT TO MARRY 
The right not to marry rests on a solid foundation of constitutionally 
protected values.  Those values, however, merely point in the direction of 
the right without revealing what state actions a right not to marry should 
tolerate or prohibit. 
A.  The Right on a Spectrum 
The few legal and scholarly attempts to define the right not to marry have 
primarily arisen in the context of marital status discrimination.  These 
attempts present what I call a maximal view of the right not to marry.  The 
argument goes something like this247:  the Supreme Court has told us that 
the right to marry is fundamental.248  In doing so, it has emphasized the 
importance of choice.249  If the choice to marry is fundamental, it must be 
protected whether that choice is affirmative or negative.250  After all, the 
choice to marry can only say something meaningful about the self if the 
person had an equally powerful choice not to marry.  Any law that 
expresses a preference for marriage—whether in benefits, property law, or 
parenting251—would tend to influence the choice in favor of marriage and 
 
 245. Id. at 30. 
 246. I have previously called for a more searching analysis of the retroactive impacts of 
domestic partner legislation. See Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Reaching Backward While 
Looking Forward:  The Retroactive Effect of California’s Domestic Partner Rights and 
Responsibilities Act, 54 UCLA L. REV. 185 (2006) (arguing that California’s expressly 
retroactive domestic partner legislation violated the state due process clause). 
 247. This particular account comes from Jennifer Jaff, Wedding Bell Blues:  The Position 
of Unmarried People in American Law, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 207 (1988).  Jaff’s article, unlike 
this one, focuses primarily on the political argument in favor of legal recognition of 
nonmarital unions. Id. at 235.  Perhaps for that reason, she did not address the state’s deep 
historical involvement in shaping and regulating the institution of marriage. See id. at 225–
34.  There are a handful of other articles that make broad assertions about the right not to 
marry without much analysis about whether such a right should exist. See, e.g., Cara C. Orr, 
Married to a Myth:  How Welfare Reform Violates the Constitutional Rights of Poor Single 
Mothers, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 211, 218 (2005). 
 248. Jaff, supra note 247, at 223. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. (citing not only decisions related to marriage like Loving v. Virginia, but also 
those that discuss the importance of choice in deciding whether or not to have children, like 
Eisenstadt v. Baird). 
 251. See id. at 210–20. 
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would therefore burden the right not to marry.252  This is a maximal view of 
the right because it would subject all laws that make distinctions based on 
marital status to constitutional scrutiny.  As we have learned from the 
marriage equality cases, those distinctions are legion.253 
On the other end of the spectrum, we might imagine a right not to marry 
that prevents the state from only the most significant and direct 
infringements.  Imagine a law that takes all unmarried adults over the age of 
thirty and pairs them off on the basis of income to maximize the resultant 
household income of all married couples.  Such a law would not only 
deprive people of the autonomous choice to marry a particular person, but 
also the choice whether to marry at all.  We can imagine a slightly less 
extreme (and more plausible) example in which a state would deem all 
presently cohabiting couples to be legally married.254  A right not to marry 
prohibiting only state interventions of this magnitude would express a much 
more minimal version of the right. 
This spectrum reveals some common ground:  both the maximal and 
minimal views would agree that at some point, a right not to marry is 
necessary to limit state action to protect the values of individual autonomy, 
freedom from excessive state interference, and stability.255  Simply put, the 
right to marry could not promote self-definition if the state could choose 
people’s spouses or deem them legally married against their will.  The more 
challenging question is at what point an infringement on the values 
protected by the rights to marry and not to marry becomes problematic.  To 
answer, we must examine how the state actions at issue intersect with those 
values. 
The problem with the maximal view is that it finds little support in the 
existing right to marry.  The implication of the maximal view is that the 
state cannot distinguish between marriage and other relationships.  
However, the state has historically taken an active role in promoting 
marriage and determining its legal incidents.256  Moreover, existing case 
law has supported these state interventions.  Courts have repeatedly held 
that the government can distribute benefits to married couples without 
running afoul of a right not to marry.257  In Califano v. Jobst,258 the Court 
 
 252. See id. at 208.  Jaff does not elaborate on her theory of how exactly the right not to 
marry would be infringed. 
 253. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2690 (2013) (noting the 
existence of over 1000 federal statutes and regulations that make classifications based on 
marital status). 
 254. The state of Washington comes somewhat close to this hypothetical situation by 
imposing marriage-like property obligations on unmarried partners who have cohabited for 
over two years and have not affirmatively opted out of owing each other legal duties. See 
CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, UNMARRIED COUPLES, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 53–59 (2010). 
 255. See supra Part II.C. 
 256. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 257. See, e.g., Zavala v. City & Cty. of Denver, 759 P.2d 664, 673 (Colo. 1988) (en banc) 
(rejecting the argument that a zoning ordinance disallowing occupancy by unmarried 
cohabitants infringed fundamental right not to marry); Willard v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health 
Servs., 592 P.2d 1103, 1106 n.1 (Wash. 1979) (en banc) (rejecting a challenge based on the 
unequal distribution of welfare benefits to married couples). 
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distinguished between rules that might “deter[]” a decision to marry 
because of the unequal provision of valuable benefits259 and attempts “to 
interfere with the individual’s freedom to make a decision as important as 
marriage”260 by “banning, or criminally prosecuting, nonconforming 
marriages.”261  Based on this distinction, the Court upheld a rule stripping a 
Social Security beneficiary of benefits based on the eligibility status of his 
spouse.262  The Court did not consider the tradeoff between marriage and 
the loss of benefits to interfere with the right to marry.  Rather, the relevant 
benefits and burdens were a part of the choice that the individual was free to 
make.263  To the Califano Court, at least, the version of autonomy that the 
Constitution protects when it protects the choice to marry does not require 
neutrality on the part of the government, just the absence of more tangible 
forms of coercion.264 
In contrast, outright mandates or prohibitions impermissibly constrain the 
right to marry even though mere incentives might not.  The bans and 
criminal prosecutions referred to in Califano amount to near-categorical 
restrictions, but one need not go quite that far.  Zablocki v. Redhail,265 
argued on the same day as Califano, involved a Wisconsin law that required 
men with noncustodial minor children to obtain a court order granting them 
permission to marry.266  Although the men could obtain the necessary court 
order by showing that they had fulfilled their support obligations and that 
their children were not likely to become public charges,267 the Court noted 
that some, like the named plaintiff, could not practically satisfy those 
requirements.268  But the Zablocki Court went further.  It also expressed 
concern that some men who could satisfy the statutory requirements would 
“be sufficiently burdened by having to do so that they [would] in effect be 
coerced into forgoing their right to marry.”269  To require the men to obtain 
a court order to marry—even if that order was based in large part on the 
fulfillment of a preexisting legal duty that they could meet—would 
 
 258. 434 U.S. 47 (1977). 
 259. Id. at 54. 
 260. Id. (emphasis added). 
 261. Id. at 54 n.11. 
 262. See id. at 48–50.  Plaintiff received Social Security benefits as the dependent of his 
deceased father.  Had the plaintiff married someone who was currently eligible for benefits 
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 263. Arguments that the burdens associated with marriage infringe the right to marry 
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 264. See supra notes 258–62 and accompanying text.  This is a descriptive claim, not a 
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 265. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
 266. See id. at 375. 
 267. See id. 
 268. See id. at 378, 387 (observing that Roger Redhail was in arrears on his child support 
payments and that his daughter would still be on public assistance even if he paid his 
existing obligations). 
 269. Id. at 387. 
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nonetheless amount to a “serious intrusion” into the men’s “freedom of 
choice.”270 
Together, Califano and Zablocki stand for the proposition that some state 
actions are problematic both because of their impacts on individual 
autonomy and because they represent a departure from the types of state 
intervention that have become an accepted part of the right to marry.271  
Admittedly, there is a wide and uncharted chasm between laws that merely 
encourage the choice to marry by favoring marriage and laws that would 
restrict the choice of spouse to a certain class of people or require judicial 
preclearance to marry.272  But it is possible to compare these laws on two 
dimensions:  the nature of state action at issue (with providing incentives 
being less problematic than imposing categorical restrictions) and the 
degree of coercion (with promotion being much less coercive than 
compulsion). 
B.  Exploring the Middle Ground 
The termination and conversion approaches adopted by states seeking to 
eliminate their nonmarital statuses allow us to develop the middle ground of 
the right not to marry. 
These approaches do not stop at promotion.  The termination of benefits 
to which people in the nonmarital statuses were previously entitled is a 
different type of state action and creates a different type of incentive than 
merely rewarding a particular choice.  The conversion approach couples 
termination with automatic conversion, eliminating the previous status and 
categorically moving people into marriage without any additional choice on 
their part. 
1.  Automatically Converting Partnerships to Marriages 
The conversion approach adopted in Washington and several other states 
marries people who have never chosen to marry and, in some instances, 
would not have affirmatively made that choice.273  These conversions 
threaten the values of autonomy and stability and therefore present a strong 
case for the application of a right not to marry. 
American jurisdictions have moved away from recognizing informal 
means of establishing valid marriages to requiring the formal choice to 
 
 270. Id. 
 271. The Zablocki Court distinguished the incentives to marry in Califano by focusing on 
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387 n.12. 
 272. Justice Powell raised this critique in his concurring opinion in Zablocki when he 
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to marry. Id. at 396 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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marry.274  For example, in Washington, couples must apply for a marriage 
license from the county auditor at least three days in advance of the 
intended wedding ceremony; they pay a sixty-six dollar fee and must either 
show up in person with acceptable identification or complete an official 
application requiring notarization; and the wedding ceremony must be 
performed by an approved officiant, among other requirements.275  These 
steps reinforce the significance of the choice to marry, give the couple 
opportunities to change their mind, and formally identify the couple to the 
state, which certifies the relationship. 
The individuals in the 3311 domestic partnerships automatically 
converted to marriages by the state of Washington did not engage in these 
formalities, but were married by operation of law.276  Because it was 
automatic, this conversion resembles a categorical restriction on the choice 
to marry.  To put it another way, the legislature, and not individuals, acted 
to change the status of the couples from unmarried to married.  There was 
no necessary exercise of autonomous choice by the partners in the direction 
of marriage.  By substituting the judgment of legislators for the decision of 
the partners, the infringement on the partners’ autonomy resembles the 
outright prohibitions that characterize the more defensible terrain of the 
right not to marry. 
One might be tempted to argue that given the similarity of domestic 
partnerships to marriage, the formal designation of “marriage” makes little 
difference.  In other words, the choice to register a domestic partnership, 
which involves its own set of formalities,277 can constitute the choice to 
marry.  But if the battle for marriage equality has taught us anything, it is 
that there is a legally significant difference between marriage and 
nonmarriage, even if the two are comprised of substantially similar rights.  
The Obergefell Court held that “the right to marry is fundamental because it 
supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the 
committed individuals.278  And the district court in Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger279 held that California’s separate-but-equal domestic 
partnership regime violated the fundamental right to marry because it “[did] 
not provide the same social meaning as marriage.”280  As a constitutional 
matter, then, the choice to enter a registered domestic partnership cannot be 
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treated the same as a choice to marry.  Any suggestion to the contrary 
should find few supporters:  both advocates and opponents of same-sex 
marriage agree on the importance of that designation. 
One might also argue that the failure to exercise a choice not to opt out 
essentially amounts to a choice to marry (albeit without the same bells and 
whistles).  There are several problems with this argument.  First, a 
voluminous literature analyzing opt-out rules reveals that the selection of 
defaults influences outcomes to a significant degree.  Multiple studies have 
found that the status quo position of a particular option will bias people 
toward that option above and beyond what their preferences would 
otherwise reveal.281  There are several different explanations for this 
phenomenon, all of which challenge the value of autonomy that the right to 
marry protects: 
[1] Mere inattention could lead some decision makers to retain a [certain] 
default if action is required only when opting out of the default.  [2] Loss-
averse decision makers may not want to give up the default because it 
feels like a loss that is more painful than gaining a different option is 
pleasurable . . . .  [3] The fact that someone has set an option as a default 
can create an “information leakage” . . . from which people might infer 
normative reasons for choosing the default.  [4] Finally, people may 
choose defaults when there are sufficient transition costs of money or time 
in choosing an alternative.282 
Of these four explanations, only the third does not offend the values that the 
rights to marry and not to marry promote, as it is consistent with the state’s 
ability to promote marriage and to proclaim its normative superiority.283  
By contrast, the first and fourth explanations are both highly plausible in the 
context of automatic conversions, and they are highly problematic. 
Recall the concern on the part of Washington officials that some 
registered partners did not receive notices of the impending conversion of 
their partnerships to marriage.284  People who did not receive notice, or who 
ignored or did not understand the notice, would be legally married based 
solely on the decisions of legislators.  Their marriages would not be a 
product of their autonomous choice, and they would therefore lose the right 
to self-determination regarding a socially and legally significant decision. 
Transaction costs pose another significant concern.  Assuming that the 
parties received notice of the impending conversion, it seems somewhat 
unlikely that the matter would be one about which they would lack strong 
preferences:  people in our society are not totally indifferent to marriage.  
Typically, stronger preferences mitigate (but do not completely erase) the 
effects of status quo bias.285  On these facts, one might therefore assume 
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that concerns about bias fall away.  However, the transaction costs of the 
decision could be significant enough to preserve the status quo. 
It is here that the potential for coercion is most visible.  The decision to 
marry comes at the end of a complicated negotiation process.286  The joint 
decision by an amicable couple to divorce would likely involve 
complications as well.  Partners might hesitate to indicate skepticism about 
marriage for fear of telegraphing a lack of commitment and hurting the 
feelings of the other; they might worry about the impact of those 
discussions on their children; they might even want to avoid the effect of 
the unpleasantness of the topic on their own sense of well-being.287  Add to 
these costs the fact that a couple agreeing not to marry would have to 
reimagine their relationship outside of the legal rights and obligations they 
previously enjoyed.  These transaction costs could make it tremendously 
difficult for individuals to depart from the default of marriage. 
Even setting aside the biases that might internally influence the choice to 
marry, the option to opt out presents additional external obstacles.  In states 
like Washington, one cannot simply opt out of a domestic partnership; one 
has to go through a substantially similar procedure to what we call 
divorce.288  This process is costly and harmful to the relationship289:  the 
average divorce costs between $15,000 and $30,000.290  Even completely 
uncontested divorces will usually cost in the hundreds to low thousands of 
dollars in attorneys fees, excluding filing fees and property transfer fees.291  
Equally significant is the imposition of an unwanted identity on the partners 
who opt out.  In addition to the impact of their views about divorce, which 
may be negative, the former partners would have to explain their breakups 
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to their family, coworkers, and friends.292  Previously partnered and never 
married are different things. 
These practical consequences essentially require partners to engage in 
self-harm to avoid marrying.  Combined with the fact that opt-out rules can 
shape individual preferences in the first instance, the option of exit from a 
converted marriage is illusory at best.  Automatic conversions therefore 
pose a great threat to the autonomy promoted by the right not to marry, as 
well as the stability central to the right to remain married or unmarried. 
2.  Terminating Statuses 
Terminating an existing status implicates the right not to marry 
differently than converting that status into marriage because it leaves the 
couple with the choice to opt into marriage.  That is, the termination will 
leave the couple unmarried.  How, then, can the act of terminating a status 
threaten the right not to marry? 
Focusing first on the quality of the state action, the act of taking away a 
right is different than the act of offering it.  When the state terminates a 
benefit it has provided and a couple has availed itself of, it acts directly to 
transport the couple from one legal category to another.  In contrast, when a 
state provides benefits as an incentive to marry, it merely makes available 
to a couple the option of choosing to take advantage of that benefit.  If the 
couple does in fact marry, the couple, not the state, moves itself to a 
different legal status.  The state’s role is more passive.  This difference 
tracks the distinction between acts and omissions that has great salience 
throughout the law.293  Social scientists have repeatedly demonstrated that 
people “often judge acts to be worse than omissions with the same 
consequences.”294  Scholars have debated the salience of the act/omission 
distinction at length, with some arguing persuasively that the distinction 
matters least when the government is the relevant actor because of the 
pervasive regulatory tools at the government’s disposal.295  Nonetheless, 
the distinction provides a useful shorthand here to illustrate the different, 
and far more assertive, character of the action taken by states in terminating 
statuses. 
Moreover, a whole range of legal doctrines express the basic premise that 
state actions depriving people of legal benefits on which they have relied 
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are suspect.  Property law doctrines—from servitudes to cotenancies, trusts, 
and leases—provide security for expectations and protect reliance 
interests.296  The Takings and Due Process Clauses likewise prevent 
legislatures from passing laws that disrupt expectations by taking property 
in which owners had a vested interest,297 imposing unforeseen liabilities,298 
or changing the character of laws on which the parties relied.299  These 
doctrines have been justified on the ground that certainty promotes the 
productive use of resources and that instability, by contrast, deters 
investment.300 
It is also worth keeping in mind that whether the nonmarital status at 
issue merely provides access to valuable employment benefits or 
approximates marriage in the range of rights and responsibilities it accords, 
those benefits would likely be protected from arbitrary deprivation by state 
officials.  In Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,301 the Court noted 
that the property interests safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment could 
take many forms, provided that the individual had “a legitimate claim of 
entitlement” as opposed to an “abstract need” or “unilateral expectation of 
it.”302  Both welfare benefits and public employment are quintessential 
examples of protected interests if they are obtained pursuant to statutory 
and administrative standards that secure them.303  We have here the 
termination of legal rights and obligations not based on the conduct or 
choice of the parties but merely because the government has decided to 
discontinue them.  If the termination of rights by the executive branch of 
government would be sufficiently disruptive to a person’s expectations that 
the Due Process Clause would require “notice and an opportunity for [a] 
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case,”304 we might be sensitive to 
the wholesale elimination of those statuses, even if that action is 
accomplished by the legislature and not the executive. 
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The coercive potential of terminations is also problematic in several 
respects.  These terminations impose time limits (weeks in the case of 
Arizona and over a year in the case of Washington) in which couples must 
exercise the choice to marry or lose their legal rights.  The idea that a 
couple can come to a quick consensus about the decision to marry, 
especially in the face of a looming legal deadline, however, ignores the 
complicated dynamics of how couples reach the decision to marry.305  
Although marriage is sometimes conceptualized as an individual right,306 
the decision-making process is complicated by the fact that two different 
individuals must come to the same decision at the same time.  Couples that 
make the decision to cohabit, for example, do not always marry; one of the 
reasons is that couples often disagree about the future of their 
relationship.307  Studies have also revealed that partners often have little 
success in persuading reluctant parties to marry.308  The decision to enter a 
formal nonmarital status might suggest that the couple would be more 
inclined to choose to marry, but individual views about the meaning of 
marriage—in all their idiosyncrasies—suggest that we cannot assume that 
one decision stands for the other.309  The imposition of deadlines creates a 
unique set of pressures that can distort the already complicated process of 
deciding to marry. 
Partners already receiving benefits might be more sensitive to the 
termination of their rights than they would be to incentives to marry.  A 
deep body of literature on the endowment effect generally supports this 
assumption:  “[T]he loss of utility associated with giving up a valued good 
is greater than the utility gain associated with receiving it.”310  That is to 
say, people value the loss of a particular benefit more greatly than they do 
the gain of that same benefit.311  If the theory holds true, then terminating 
existing benefits will influence choice more than the typical situation in 
which benefits are merely offered as an inducement. 
Coercion is only heightened when the rights and responsibilities are the 
type on which people would reasonably rely.  As discussed in Part II.C 
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above, it is unclear whether the right not to marry, as opposed to due 
process considerations, would protect a person’s reliance on a nonmarital 
status.312  That said, the termination of benefits on which a person has 
relied might coerce that person to seek those rights through marriage, 
impacting the decision to marry. 
The Arizona domestic partner regime, for example, provided “health, 
dental, life disability, and vision benefits,” but little else.313  Even those 
limited benefits, however, could have a value of between one-fifth and one-
third of the employee’s total compensation.314  Domestic partnership 
regimes like the one in Washington went much further, providing all of the 
state rights and responsibilities of marriage, covering a whole range of 
subjects including community property, evidentiary privileges, standing to 
sue for wrongful death, rights to parental status and custody over children, 
and much more.315  The domestic partner status in Washington therefore 
invited couples to make even deeper legally binding commitments on 
multiple dimensions of their lives. 
When the state of Michigan refused to recognize same-sex marriages that 
were validly performed during a one-day window between a district court 
decision and court of appeals stay, the Caspar court worried that 
children would suddenly face the stigma that their family was no longer 
legally recognized.  Estate plans would leave unaddressed taxable events 
or incidents with costly tax consequences.  Carefully crafted pension 
arrangements would become inoperative, plunging survivors into 
potentially ruinous financial hardship. . . .  And such disarray would come 
about not because of action voluntarily taken by the couple after they 
married, but rather due solely to a change in the solemnizing state’s 
law.316 
These consequences would unfold with greater force following the 
termination of many domestic partnerships, especially those lasting for 
years instead of days.317  Domestic partners would have to transition from 
community property to separate property and would lose presumptions of 
parentage, intestate succession rights, and pension and other employment 
benefits.  A partner who left his job to care for an adopted child could 
therefore lose the attribution of half his partner’s income, health insurance 
and related benefits, the right to inherit a significant portion of the couple’s 
accumulated property without a will, and he could even face uncertainty 
about his parental rights.  Where the only avenue to maintain these rights is 
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to marry, it is difficult to imagine how the termination of these rights would 
not burden that choice. 
The Califano and Zablocki cases discussed above distinguished between 
the act of offering legal benefits to married couples, which would not 
impermissibly influence the choice to marry, and imposing requirements 
that might be onerous or impossible to satisfy, which would significantly 
burden the choice.318  Terminations clearly fall in the gray area between 
those two poles.  All terminations involve a greater degree of coercive state 
action than incentives because they change the status quo.  They also exert 
greater pressure on individual choice, threatening the value of self-
definition and autonomy:  at a certain point, the rights and responsibilities 
couples enjoyed become so pervasive that the decision to go without those 
rights would extract too high a cost.319 
3.  The Spectrum Revisited 
The right not to marry advances individual autonomy but it also 
accommodates some promotion of marriage.  Conversions constitute 
recognizable infringements of the right not to marry because they cross the 
line from promoting to imposing marriage.  This is true both in terms of the 
nature of the state’s actions and the impact of those actions on freedom of 
choice.  Conversions approach categorical restrictions on the right not to 
marry—marrying people by operation of law. 
Terminations, while less categorical, are nonetheless more coercive than 
mere incentives.  The degree to which people in nonmarital statuses might 
have organized their lives around those rights and responsibilities only 
heightens the coerciveness of the state actions.  The level of coerciveness, 
in turn, threatens the value of autonomy.  It also imperils the value of 
stability that the Court has found to promote the development and 
maintenance of one’s sense of self.320  Where the rights associated with a 
nonmarital status approach the rights granted to married couples, and the 
circumstances surrounding the termination of the status exacerbate rather 
than mitigate the impact of the transition, the act of terminating a status can 
also raise constitutional concerns. 
This view of the right not to marry does not threaten the state’s interest in 
promoting marriage.  If anything, cases establishing the right to marry have 
increasingly recognized that an objective of state intervention is to enable 
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greater individual freedom.321  In analyzing the limits of federal coercion of 
state governments through the federal spending power, the Court observed 
that our federalism “rests on what might at first seem a counter-intuitive 
insight, that freedom is enhanced by the creation of two governments, not 
one.”322  In this context, that concept suggests that the state has an interest 
not only in serving its own ends, but also in preserving a realm of privacy 
for its citizens.323  The legitimacy of the system of privatized dependency 
hinges in part on the voluntary aspect of marriage.  Privatized support 
would not be accepted if the social meaning of marriage were based solely 
on government compulsion rather than love and altruism.324  Likewise, the 
moral basis for marriage would be eroded if it were less of an altruistic, 
individual commitment.325  This too should counsel against an expansive 
understanding of the state’s interest in encouraging marriage.  When 
encouragement becomes compulsion, the state strikes the balance too far in 
favor of promotion and begins to undermine its own goals. 
CONCLUSION:  
BEYOND CONVERSIONS AND TERMINATIONS 
This Article concludes that the Fourteenth Amendment recognizes a right 
not to marry and that conversions and terminations of nonmarital statuses 
can infringe that right.  In doing so, it lays a foundation for analyzing other 
state actions that arguably infringe a right not to marry.  As this Article has 
argued, the most proximate concern, following on the heels of marriage 
equality, is the termination or conversion of nonmarital statuses.  But it is 
not difficult to foresee other future applications. 
Marriage As an Alternative to Prosecution or Punishment 
In August 2015, a Texas judge ordered Josten Bundy, who faced charges 
for assaulting his girlfriend’s ex-boyfriend, to marry his girlfriend within 
thirty days as a condition of probation.326  The judge offered Bundy an 
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alternative fifteen-day sentence which Bundy declined for fear of losing his 
job, even though he would otherwise have preferred jail time to 
marriage.327  This contemporary example brings to mind the historical 
practice of presenting marriage as a bar to prosecution for crimes like 
seduction328 or rape.329  Just as in those historical contexts, Bundy faced the 
choice of incarceration or marriage.  The existence of a right not to marry 
would suggest that such a condition is likely unconstitutional.330 
Common Law Marriage Conscription 
Thomas Green, an avowed polygamist, participated in marriage-like 
relationships with nine different women, ultimately settling with five of the 
women and their twenty-five children in Juab County, Utah, where they set 
up a mobile home community.331  Although some of his marriages were 
licensed, he always divorced one wife before marrying another, even 
though he continued to live with his previous spouses.332  State prosecutors 
charged Green with bigamy, which criminalizes cohabitation with someone 
other than the defendant’s spouse.333  At the time, however, Green was not 
formally married to any of his wives.  The prosecutors therefore filed a 
motion prior to the preliminary hearing on the charges seeking a court order 
deeming Green married to Linda Kunz under a state statute codifying 
common law marriage principles.334  The court issued an order finding that 
Green and Kunz were married, and Green was ultimately convicted on 
several counts of bigamy.335 
The Green case is just one dramatic example of the conscriptive effect of 
common law marriage.336  Although Green considered himself married to 
Kunz under his personal definition of marriage, neither he nor Kunz 
considered themselves legally married.337  Common law marriage raises 
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complicated questions about what it means to choose to marry that are 
beyond the scope of this Article, but the imposition of marriage over the 
objections of both potential spouses raises serious concerns about the limits 
of a state’s power to label people as married over their express statements to 
the contrary. 
The Right to Divorce 
Divorce did not exist at common law and has been characterized as a 
legislative entitlement rather than a protected right.338  Nonetheless, in 
Boddie v. Connecticut,339 the Supreme Court held, as a matter of procedural 
due process, that a state could not deny divorces to those who could not 
afford to pay for them.340  The Court reasoned that because marriage 
imposes significant legal obligations on the spouses, including criminal 
restrictions on bigamy (which could practically result if a person wanted to 
remarry but could not get a divorce), lack of access to the judicial process 
based on the inability to pay would deprive parties of the “only available” 
“dispute-settlement technique” without due process of law.341  The Court 
did not need to go so far as to hold that divorce itself is a fundamental right; 
it was already available in the state for a cost.  Moreover, the Court 
suggested that its solicitude for divorce was grounded in concerns about the 
right to remarry, not the ability of people to end their relationships at 
will.342  Not all divorces result in remarriage, however.  Grounding divorce 
in the self-definitional aspects of the right not to marry would better explain 
the importance of divorce in contemporary family life. 
*     *     * 
The existence and scope of a right not to marry is central to the ongoing 
discussion of the extent to which both states and society at large should 
promote marriage over other forms of intimate relationships.  A sharper 
understanding of the relevant constitutional values can play a valuable role 
in informing those debates. 
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